2541-6111Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesiareaksi2541-61111411-6510Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta10.23917/reaksi.v10i1.6761Good Corporate Governance Modeling on Opportunistic Behavior - Related Party TransactionFatchanLia RamadhaniIndonesiaTrisnawati*RinaIndonesiart116@ums.ac.idSetiawatiErmaIndonesiaFaculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Muhammadiyah SurakartaCorresponding author: *Rina Trisnawati, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta .Email:rt116@ums.ac.id3042025304202510110711930920243042025Copyright (c) 2025 Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia2025Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.Good Corporate Governance Modeling on Opportunistic Behavior - Related Party Transaction
This study aims to examine the role of good corporate governance in influencing the relationship between family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections with related party transactions (RPT). The research method uses a quantitative approach with secondary data. Samples using purposive sampling techniques were obtained from 36 mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2017-2022 period. From this sampling technique, after removing incomplete data and outliers, 211 observable data were obtained. Data analysis used moderated regression analysis. The results of the study indicate that good corporate governance is able to moderate the relationship between institutional ownership and political connections with RPT but is unable to moderate between family ownership and RPT. The practical implications of this study can be used as a consideration for the government to make regulations so that the implementation of good corporate governance is more effective in companies whose shares are majority owned by families
Related Party TransactionFamily OwnershipInstitutional OwnershipPolitical ConnectionFile created by JATS EditorJATS Editorissue-created-year2025Introduction
Financial statements are accounting products that provide important information for investors to assess management performance in managing a company. On the one hand, these reports are the main tool for companies to convey financial information regarding management responsibilities, while on the other hand, external parties need reliable information about the assets they invest in the company. In order for the information in financial statements to be useful for decision-making, it must be relevant and trustworthy.
The information in financial statements will be more useful if presented transparently, accurately, and on time, so that shareholders, creditors, and potential investors can evaluate the company's financial condition and business sustainability as a basis for decision-making. One of the important information presented in the financial statements is related to related party transactions (RPT). The company's commitment to disclose RPT information in a comprehensive manner is very important so that investors and other users of financial statements can monitor and assess the impact of the transaction on the company's performance (Gordon et al., 2004).
According to PSAK No. 07, a party that has a special relationship (RPT) is when one party has the ability to control or exert significant influence on the other party in financial and operational decision-making. A transaction between parties that have a special relationship is defined as the transfer of resources or obligations between them, regardless of whether the price is taken into account or not.
Some of the factors that are estimated to affect RPT include family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections. However, research on the relationship between family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections to RPT shows mixed results. For example, research by (Azim et al., 2018) and (Alhadab et al., 2020) found that family ownership has an effect on RPT. In contrast, a study by (Nuritomo et al., 2020) and (Alhadab et al., 2020) shows that family ownership has no effect on RPT.
On the other hand, research on the influence of institutional ownership on RPT by (Alhadab et al., 2020) shows the existence of an influence, while a study by (Wijaya & Suprasto, 2015) and (Supatmi et al., 2019) shows that institutional ownership has no effect on RPT.
Meanwhile, the research on the influence of political connections on RPT was carried out by (Santosa & Nugrahanti, 2022) who stated that political connections have a positive effect on RPT. These results are supported by research (Daresta & Suryani, 2022) that political connections can detect fraud in financial statements. While the results of the study (Kesaulya et al., 2023) stated that the board of directors and the board of commissioners who are politically connected have no effect on RPT.
There is an inconsistency in the results of the study, so the researcher tries to include the good corporate governance variable to moderate the relationship between family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections to RPT. RPT research by including corporate governance variables as moderation variables and political connection variables is still rarely carried out, so this is a novelty of this study.
According to (A.G & Nell, 2011) Corporate Governance describes the relationship between various parties in determining the direction and performance of the company. Initially, this concept was limited to the interaction between shareholders, the board of commissioners, and management. However, as time progresses, more groups show interest in the company, so the goal of Corporate Governance to ensure a balance between all these interests. (Cadbury, 1992) Define Corporate Governance as a system to manage and control the company. As a system, Corporate Governance requires a variety of components, including corporate law, securities law, trade regulations, accounting standards, bankruptcy law, competition law, and important court rulings related to indemnity. In addition, there are market institutions and their practices, good corporate management guidelines, and mechanisms to meet the expectations of minority shareholders (Lukviarman, 2004).
Several studies on the influence of corporate governance on RPT, such as those conducted by ((Azim et al., 2018); (Diyanti et al., 2013); Pratista 2018; (Pebri et al., 2020)) show that Corporate Governance affect RPT. Corporate governance mechanisms can reduce opportunistic behavior of management (Wiyadi et al., 2019). Ultimately, good governance will improve the company's performance (Trisnawati et al., 2019). This study aims to test the influence of Corporate Governance in moderating the relationship between family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections to RPT.
Literature Review and Hypothesis
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory of agency that separates the ownership and control of a company. The separation of ownership between the agent and the control (principal) in an organization has an impact on the agency conflict in the form of an agreement/contract between the owner (principal) and the manager (agent). Owners hire managers to carry out company management activities on their behalf, by delegating decision-making to agents.
The manager as the manager of the company knows more information and future prospects of the company than the owner (shareholder). Therefore, it is the responsibility of the manager as the manager to give signals to the owner about the state of the company. The signal is in the form of publication of accounting information such as financial statements.
Structure Corporate ownership determines the nature of agency problems, which can occur between managers and shareholders, or between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A family company typically has a majority of shares owned by the founder, the founding family, or an institution managed by a member of the founding family, known as a pyramidal ownership structure. This majority ownership creates a unique agency conflict dynamic within family companies, where more significant conflicts arise between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2005).
According to (Mohammed, 2019), family companies more often face type II agency problems, which are conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, compared to type I agency problems involving principals and agents. In this context, controlling shareholders tend to take advantage of related party transactions (RPTs) to transfer the company's profits and wealth for their personal interests, as they have a strong incentive to maximize their profits at the expense of minority shareholders, known as expropriation.
(Hu et al., 2012) stated that the existence of information that is widely owned by family ownership as a controlling shareholder so that it becomes a means to carry out the exploitation of company resources that can harm minority shareholders due to the existence of Tunneling which is carried out by the controlling shareholder. (Pound, 1988) states that RPTs can degrade the company's performance and RPTs performed by family companies, are more likely to be used opportunistically to take over minority shareholders. From the explanation above, the following hypothesis is formulated;
H1 : Family ownership affects related party transactions
Institutional ownership in a company can be owned by financial institutions (banks, insurance companies). (Pound, 1988) put forward two possibilities that arise due to institutional ownership. The first is the Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that individual investors or insiders with low shareholding (minority shareholders) tend to leverage the voting power of majority institutional shareholders to oversee management performance. This reduces the likelihood of related party transactions occurring (related party transactions).
The second alternative is the Conflict of Interest Hypothesis, which contradicts the first hypothesis. In this case, the majority of institutional investors tend to reduce conflicts by forging compromises and alliances with management, thereby increasing the likelihood of related party transactions.
Research conducted by (Putri & Nasir, 2006) Regarding institutional ownership and related party transactions, it was found that institutional ownership has an effect on management behavior. The high debt policy makes the company supervised by debtholders. With stricter supervision, managers tend to act according to interests debtholders and Shareholders. Therefore, the volume of related party transactions, including debts and receivables, is reduced due to the supervision carried out by the institution, because such transactions are often contrary to the interests of the institutional parties. Based on this explanation, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows.
H2: Institutional ownership affects related party transactions.
Political connections occur when there are members of the board of directors or commissioners who have or are currently serving in the government, military, or police (Wulandari, 2018). Political relations with the government give companies special treatment, so they feel protected by the government, including in cases of adverse actions such as fraud. Political connections can also facilitate companies in conducting related party transactions more securely (Qian & Yeung, 2011). Companies involved in related party transactions with controlling shareholders tend to tunnel and take advantage of the transaction (Chen et al., 2005).
Research (Habib et al., 2017) found that there was a positive influence of political connections on related party transactions. While different results were obtained in the research (Nodeh & Gerayli, 2020) which shows that political connections have a negative effect on the transactions of related parties. However, research (Abdullatif et al., 2019) in Jordan found that there was no influence between political connections and related party transactions. Based on the explanation above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H3: Political connections affect related party transactions
One of the reasons for the corporate governance mechanism that needs to be implemented is the existence of concentrated ownership, especially family ownership, which will have full policies to determine the direction of the company, causing a conflict of interest between controlling shareholders (majority) and non-controlling shareholders (minority).
(Diyanti et al., 2013) Researching Corporate governance with a CGI index that moderates family ownership with RPT has the result that corporate governance reduces the motive of controlling shareholder exploitation carried out through related party transactions. (Agnihotri & Bhattacharya, 2019) shows that the concentration of ownership negatively moderates the impact of governance variables with RPT.
(Azim et al., 2018) found that corporate governance is weaker in Pakistani family companies where major shareholders take over resources through RPTs and have a negative tendency for the takeover of resources of family-owned companies. (Malawat et al., 2018) which examines the influence of corporate governance moderation in conjunction with Pyramid of Structure and the RPT concludes that The implementation of corporate governance has not been fully implemented by the company because corporate governance is more dominated by institutions legal-formal by the family. This causes a strong incentive for the family who serves as commissioners or directors to influence the decisions of the independent board of commissioners in the company. Based on the explanation above, the formulation of the hypothesis in this study is as follows;
H4: Good corporate governance moderates the relationship between family ownership and related party transactions.
Institutional ownership can be seen from the percentage of share ownership from financial institutions in a company to the total outstanding shares (Putri & Nasir, 2006). (Pound, 1988) stated that the tendency of the majority of institutional investors to reduce conflicts by making compromises and alliances with the management. Thus, the possibility of Related Party Transaction to be open. Several studies on the influence of institutional ownership on RPT show mixed results. Research (Pound, 1988), (Alhadab et al., 2020) stated that institutional ownership affects temporary RPT (Wijaya & Suprasto, 2015); (Supatmi et al., 2019) institutional ownership has no effect on RPT.
Based on the inconsistency of the results of the above study, this study tries to include corporate governance variables as moderation variables to see the influence of these variables in the relationship between share ownership
families with RPT. One way to mitigate agency problems is to implement a good and effective corporate governance system. Some studies related to influence good corporate governance towards Related Party Transaction among other research (Diyanti et al., 2013) and (Pebri et al., 2020) which states that good corporate governance affect RPT. A company with institutional ownership and quality good corporate governance good ones will have more effective monitoring so that the negative impact of RPT tends to be reduced. Based on the explanation above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H5: Good corporate governance moderates the relationship between institutional ownership and related party transactions.
Political connections can be used by companies to carry out tunneling activities or opportunistic behavior. Tunneling activities refer to the transfer of assets and profits from a company to meet the interests of the majority shareholder (Johnson et al., 2000) This action is often detrimental to minority shareholders because majority shareholders tend to make decisions that benefit themselves without paying attention to the welfare of minority shareholders (Sukarmanto et al., 2020). Companies that have political connections have the potential to tunnel for the benefit of the majority shareholders with the support of their political connections. Some relevant research, such as those conducted by (Habib et al., 2017) and (Nodeh & Gerayli, 2020), indicating that political connections affect transactions with related parties. Moreover (Wang et al., 2019) stated that political connections affect the ability to detect fraud in financial statements.
To prevent tunneling carried out by companies, a good GCG is needed. Therefore, this study includes GCG variables in influencing the relationship between political connections and RPT. Companies with good GCG will be able to prevent management behavior that has political connections to conduct RPT transactions that can harm minority shareholders. Based on the explanation above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
ImageResearch Methods
This type of research is quantitative research. The research data used is in the form of audited financial statements from mining companies listed on the IDX from 2017 to 2022. The data required comes from the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange, namely, www.idx.co.id. The research sample was taken using purposive sampling from 36 mining companies and 211 financial report data were obtained. The sample criteria include:
The researcher obtained a complete annual report of mining sector companies from 2017 to 2022 through the official website of each company and on the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id.)
Companies that include information related to research variables in their annual reports.
In this study, the dependent variable used is the transaction of the related party or Related Party Transaction (RPT) which is measured from the sum of sales RPT, purchase RPT, Debt RPT and receivables RPT divided by total assets.
Meanwhile, the independent variables used were family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections. Family ownership indicates the ownership of shares owned by the family, or the family has an important role in the management of the company. Family ownership in this study is measured by the number of percentage shares owned by family members.
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by the government, companies or insurers, foreign investors or banks with a primary interest in the investment made. Institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the institution.
In the variable of political connection, a company is considered to have political connections if there is at least one high-ranking official, such as a member of the board of directors, board of commissioners, company secretary, or majority shareholder, who has served as president, regent, minister, member of parliament, or member of a political party, or has a close family relationship with a politician or individual with a military background (Murhadi, 2021). Political connections are measured using a dummy variable, where a value of 1 is given if the company's commissioners, directors, secretary, or majority shareholder has political connections, and a value of 0 if not.
The moderation variables of this study are good corporate governance which is measured using an index developed by (Hermawan, 2011) because it is more detailed and more suitable to be applied to companies in Indonesia. The Ancella Index not only measures the effectiveness of the function of the board of commissioners and directors consisting of 17 question items, but also measures how effective the audit committee function is as a supervisory function consisting of 11 question items. Each answer is given a score of 2, 1, and 0.
The research data used panel data processed with Eviews version 9 software. The data panel combines cross section data and time series data, so that the number of observations that can be used for the purpose of estimating population parameters will be larger. The more samples used in the study, the more accurate the level of research results will increase. The regression model test uses the following equation:
FO*GCG : The Interaction of Family Ownership with Good Corporate Governance
KI*GCG : Institutional Ownership Interaction with Good Corporate Governance
KP*GCG : The Interaction of Political Connections with Good Corporate Governance
E : error
Results and Discussion
The research data source used financial statements from 36 mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2017-2022 period and obtained initial sample data of 216. Furthermore, by using the purposive sampling technique and disposing of outlier data, the final sample data of 211 was obtained. The following Table 1 shows the number of research sample data based on predetermined criteria.
Research Sample Data
Population: Number of Mining Companies for the period 2017-2022
216
Sample Selection
2
The number of mining companies for the 2017-2022 period that did not present complete financial statements (not found).
(0)
3
Companies that do not include information related to research variables in their annual reports.
(0)
4
Data outlier
(5)
5
Number of final samples used
211
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
RPT
0.052
0.782
0.000
0.101
FO
0.334
0.910
0.000
0.276
KI
0.560
1.009
0.000
0.223
KP
0.455
1.000
0.000
0.499
GCG
72.076
83.000
55.000
6.959
FO*GCG
23.639
62.804
0.000
20.006
KI*GCG
KP*GCG
40.582
0.017
79.925
0.281
0.000
0.000
16.633
0.043
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. Related party transactions (RPT) showed an average of 0.052, with maximum and minimum values of 0.782 and 0, respectively. The average value of 0.052 indicates that the rate of related party transactions that occur is quite low, around 5%.
Family ownership (FO) has an average of 0.334, with maximum and minimum values of 0.910 and 0, respectively, considering that there are companies that do not have family ownership. The average family ownership of 33% is relatively high, in accordance with PSAK No. 15, which states that majority ownership occurs if the shares owned exceed 20%, while minority ownership occurs if it is less than 20%. With an average share ownership of 33%, this shows that the family or founder of the company still holds a dominance in the percentage of share ownership in Indonesia.
Institutional ownership (KI) has an average value of 0.560 with a maximum and minimum value of 1.009 and 0, respectively. Institutional ownership with an average value of 56% is high, this shows that the companies in the sample are 56% owned by other institutions.
Political connections (KP) have an average score of 0.455 with maximum and minimum values of 1,000 and 0, respectively. The average political connection of mining companies of 50% shows that half of the company's board of commissioners, board of directors, and shareholders have political relations in both the government and political parties.
Corporate governance (GCG) has an average score of 72,076, with a maximum and minimum score of 83 and 55, respectively. This shows that the average corporate governance in the mining sector in Indonesia is 72%, which indicates that the company's governance practices are in the good category.
Before hypothesis testing, classical assumption tests were carried out including normality tests, autocorrelation tests, multicollineiality tests, and heteroscedasticity tests. The results of the classical assumption test found that the research data passed all tests of normality, autocorrelation, multioclenierity, and heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, hypothesis testing using Moderated Regression Analysis is presented in Table 3 as follows:
Moderated regression Analysis
Variable
RPT
Model 1
Model 2
C
0.0000
0.0025
FO
0.0110**
0.1468
KI
0.0000*
0.0000*
KP
0.9778
0.0138**
FO*GCG
0.1355
KI*GCG
0.0000*
KP*GCG
0.0000*
Adjusted R Squared
0.109100
0.289905
F statistic
9.572.256
13.247.860
Probability
0.000006
0.000000
N (Observations)
211
211
Remarks: * and ** show significance of 1% and 5% respectively; RPT = Transactions of debt-related parties, receivables, sales and purchases; KK = Percentage of family share ownership; KI = Percentage of institutional shareholding; KP = Board of directors, board of commissioners, and shareholders who have political connections; GCG = Ancella Index (2011)
Table 3 shows the results of panel data regression testing using a research model with random effect. The first hypothesis (H1) that family ownership affects related party transactions is accepted. The results of this study are consistent with the research conducted by (Azim et al., 2018)and (Ernawati & Aryani, 2019).
Family ownership has been proven to increase the volume of related party transactions. When the controlling shareholder comes from the family, the motivation to carry out related party transactions is stronger. This is understandable because if several companies (group of companies) are under the control of one family, the family's wealth is distributed across various companies. This situation allows expropriation to occur through related party transactions (Diyanti et al., 2013). Family-run companies tend to have low motivation to disclose related party transactions. These findings indicate that families as controlling shareholders are utilizing related party transactions for their benefit (Ernawati & Aryani, 2019).
The results of the study support the second hypothesis (H2), which states that institutional ownership has an effect on related party transactions (RPT). This shows that companies with shares owned by institutions tend to be more effective in preventing management from conducting unnatural transactions. The presence of institutional investors serves as a good supervisory mechanism in strategic decision-making, so that managers are not easily influenced by profit manipulation and the use of company assets becomes more efficient. Institutional ownership creates a system of control and oversight that encourages managers to focus more on the company's performance, thereby reducing selfish behavior. As expressed by (Zahro, 2018), the percentage of institutional ownership in the company has an impact on the preparation of annual financial statements that are more accrual, in line with management objectives.
The results of this study support the research (Alhadab et al., 2020) that institutional ownership affects Related Party Transaction. While the results of different studies were carried out by (Wijaya & Suprasto, 2015) and (Supatmi et al., 2019) which found that institutional ownership had no effect on related party transaction.
The results of the study show that the third hypothesis (H3) is accepted that political connections have an effect on RPT. The results of this test support the research (Habib et al., 2017) and (Rahman & Nugrahanti, 2021) who found that political connections have an effect on RPT. (Habib et al., 2017) stated that the existence of political connections can be used to carry out tunneling practices through related party transactions carried out by majority shareholders against minority shareholders. (Rahman & Nugrahanti, 2021) states that companies with political connections can take over through related party transactions because they have legal protection from these political connections.
The results of the study show that the fourth hypothesis (H4) is rejected that good corporate governance does not moderate the relationship between family ownership and RPT. This may be due to the fact that companies in Indonesia are only limited to following the applicable rules related to the existence of GCG but in their implementation it is still not effective because the role of the family is still very large. Companies should need to implement good governance because it will prevent the occurrence of exploitation from companies whose shares are concentrated in the family in the form of related transactions. Good corporate governance will have an effective monitoring process so that minority shareholders will be protected from unfavorable actions from majority shareholders.
The results of the research are in line with the research conducted by (Malawat et al., 2018) which examines the influence of corporate governance moderation in relation to Pyramid of Structure and RPT. Asean corporate governance scorecard developed by the OECD and concluded that the application of Corporate Governance has not been fully implemented by the company because corporate governance is more dominated by institutions legal-formal by the family. This causes a strong incentive for the family who serves as commissioners or directors to influence the decisions of the independent board of commissioners in the company.
The results of this study are not in accordance with the research (Dyanty et al., 2019) which states that corporate governance can reduce the motive of expropriation of controlling shareholders carried out through related party transactions. Similarly, it is different from the results of the study (Agnihotri & Bhattacharya, 2019) shows that corporate governance moderating family ownership with RPT.
The results of the study show that the fifth hypothesis (H5) is accepted that good corporate governance moderates the relationship between institutional ownership and RPT. These results show that the governance implemented by the company is able to prevent opportunistic behavior carried out by management to minority shareholders through related transactions. In this case, the interests of the majority institutional shareholders are different from the interests of the management. Institutional shareholders are more effective in supervising the management because they have good institutional tools.
The results of this study support the research (Alhadab et al., 2020) which states that institutional ownership affects RPT. Meanwhile, the research (Diyanti et al., 2013) states that good corporate governance affect RPT. Companies with institutional ownership and good GCG quality will have more effective monitoring so that they will be able to reduce the negative impact of RPT.
The results of the study show that the sixth hypothesis (H6) is accepted that good corporate governance mediates the relationship between political connections and RPT. These results are in accordance with the research (Ismail et al., 2022) which shows that companies in Egypt are strongly influenced by boards of directors that have political ties to governance practices in reducing the effects of RPT. Next (Sari & Putri, 2014) and (Maharti & Nugrahanti, 2022) stated that a company with good governance can be seen from an independent board of commissioners that can reduce the positive relationship between political connections and profit management practices. This proves that opportunistic behavior in companies that have political connections can be minimized with the existence of an independent board of commissioners.
Conclusion
This study aims to examine the relationship between family ownership, institutional ownership, and political connections to related party transactions, with good corporate governance (GCG) as moderation, in mining companies during the 2017-2022 period. Data analysis shows that the average family ownership in Indonesian mining companies reaches 33.4%. In accordance with PSAK No. 15, investors are considered to have significant influence if they own 20% or more of the voting rights, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it can be concluded that the majority of mining companies in Indonesia are owned by families.
Furthermore, the results of the study show that GCG in mining companies in Indonesia cannot affect the relationship between family ownership and related party transactions. The implementation of corporate governance has not been fully implemented by the company because corporate governance is dominated by legal-formal institutions by the family. This causes a strong incentive for family members who serve as commissioners or directors to carry out opportunistic behavior by prioritizing the interests of majority shareholders over minority shareholders.
The results of the study also show that GCG affects the relationship between institutional ownership and political connections to related party transactions. The implementation of GCG will be more effective in companies whose share ownership is owned by other institutions or companies. This is understandable because usually institutions have the ability to conduct better supervision than individual shareholders. Similarly, GCG can also influence companies to prevent opportunistic behavior caused by political connections with the government.
This research has several limitations. First, the focus of this research is only on mining companies in Indonesia. Therefore, further research should explore other corporate sectors in Indonesia to gain broader insights.
Second, future research is expected to use newer and more detailed corporate governance measurements, as well as follow the latest regulations related to governance, especially in more complex mining companies.
Third, in subsequent studies, it is recommended to conduct an ownership analysis by considering the portion of family ownership, for example by distinguishing between ownership below 20% and above 20%.
Compensation
This research is funded by DRPTM for the 2024 fiscal year with the Master's Thesis Research scheme. Decree No. 007/LL6/PB/AL.04/2024 and Contract No. 196.116/A,3-III/LRI/VI/2024 dated June 14, 2024
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