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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="1.3" article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="issn">2541-6111</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia</journal-title><abbrev-journal-title>reaksi</abbrev-journal-title></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2541-6111</issn><issn pub-type="ppub">1411-6510</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.23917/reaksi.v9i1.3636</article-id><article-categories/><title-group><article-title>Tax Avoidance : Do Foreign Interests Have a Role?</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Nurcahya</surname><given-names>Sifit Dwi</given-names></name><address><country>Indonesia</country><email>sifitd.nurc@student.uns.ac.id</email></address><xref ref-type="aff" rid="AFF-1"/><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor-0"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Setiawan</surname><given-names>Doddy</given-names></name><address><country>Indonesia</country></address><xref ref-type="aff" rid="AFF-2"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Aryani</surname><given-names>Y. Anni</given-names></name><address><country>Indonesia</country></address><xref ref-type="aff" rid="AFF-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Sudaryono</surname><given-names>Eko Arief</given-names></name><address><country>Indonesia</country></address><xref ref-type="aff" rid="AFF-1"/></contrib><aff id="AFF-1">Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Sebelas Maret</aff><aff id="AFF-2">Faculty of Economics and Business,Universitas Sebelas Maret</aff></contrib-group><author-notes><corresp id="cor-0"><bold>Corresponding author: Sifit Dwi Nurcahya</bold>, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Sebelas Maret .Email:<email>sifitd.nurc@student.uns.ac.id</email></corresp></author-notes><pub-date date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2023-5-15" publication-format="electronic"><day>15</day><month>5</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date date-type="collection" iso-8601-date="2024-4-30" publication-format="electronic"><day>30</day><month>4</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>1</fpage><lpage>12</lpage><history><date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2023-12-20"><day>20</day><month>12</month><year>2023</year></date><date date-type="accepted" iso-8601-date="2024-5-31"><day>31</day><month>5</month><year>2024</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2024 Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia</copyright-holder><license><ali:license_ref xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0</ali:license_ref><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://journals2.ums.ac.id/index.php/reaksi/article/view/3636" xlink:title="Tax Avoidance : Do Foreign Interests Have a Role?">Tax Avoidance : Do Foreign Interests Have a Role?</self-uri><abstract><p>FDI may have beneficial effects on economic development. On the other hand, the presence of foreign investment leads to foreign interest, which has the potential to minimize tax burden by exploiting cross-border tax policy discretion. This study examines the influence of foreign interest on the tax avoidance practices of firms in Indonesia. This is quantitative research using a sample of firms listed in the IDX80 index with a financial reporting period of 2018-2021. The results of this study indicate that foreign ownership has a positive effect on tax avoidance. Meanwhile, the number of foreign commissioners and the number of foreign directors does not affect tax avoidance. Apart from contributing to the theory, this study is also a concern for the DGT in anticipating the risk of tax avoidance by foreign capital firms.</p><p>Keywords: tax avoidance, foreign ownership, foreign board of commissioner, foreign board of director</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>tax avoidance</kwd><kwd>foreign ownership</kwd><kwd>foreign board of commissioner</kwd><kwd>foreign board of director</kwd></kwd-group><custom-meta-group><custom-meta><meta-name>File created by JATS Editor</meta-name><meta-value><ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://jatseditor.com" xlink:title="JATS Editor">JATS Editor</ext-link></meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta><meta-name>issue-created-year</meta-name><meta-value>2024</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-group></article-meta></front><body><sec><title>Introduction</title><p>The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were set to solve the problem of poverty and promote inclusive and sustainable growth by 2030 <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-7">(Bappenas, 2015)</xref>. To achieve this, significant resources are needed, including financial resources. In this case, taxation is one of the main sources of revenue in the Indonesian APBN. Tax revenue reaches 70% of the total government revenue.</p><p>It is important to maintain the resilience of tax revenue. It is still necessary to increase Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio. Indonesia's tax ratio is still below the Asia-Pacific average tax ratio of 19,1% <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-34">(O.E.C.D., 2022)</xref>. Indonesia's tax ratio in the period 2016-2022 is still at 9% - 11% <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-10">(Damara, 2023)</xref>. This figure illustrates the narrowness of Indonesia's tax base and low tax compliance in Indonesia.</p><p>Tax avoidance erodes tax contributions to the country. Tax avoidance schemes can limit the government's ability to fund public facilities, thereby hindering progress towards the SDGs <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-44">(Trade &amp; Development, 2019)</xref>. Tax avoidance is an effort to minimize the amount of taxes paid through a tax planning strategy <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-18">(Hanlon &amp; Heitzman, 2010)</xref>. Tax avoidance can be used as an option to minimize the tax burden listed in financial reports in a way that does not violate the law <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-31">(Mardiasmo, 2018)</xref>. However, the government does not want this.</p><p>Foreign direct investment (FDI) is cross-border investment where an investor based in one economy has long-term interests and significant influence in an enterprise based in another economy <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-34">(O.E.C.D., 2022)</xref>. FDI in Indonesia was recorded at US$20,1 million in 2021 and is the second largest in Southeast Asia <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-11">(dataindonesiaid, 2022)</xref>. FDI can boost economic growth in developing countries.</p><p>FDI is an important channel for technology transfer between countries, promotes international trade through access to foreign markets, and can be an important means of economic development. Today's business world is interconnected between countries. The challenge is that multinational companies may be able to minimize or double non-taxation <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-23">(Indonesiagoid, 2023)</xref>. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is a threat to tax fairness in many countries through profit shifting, especially in developing countries.</p><p>Tax avoidance attracts policymakers' and researchers' attention. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-4">(Atwood et al., 2012)</xref>), stated that firms avoid taxes due to various factors, such as firm-internal factors (firm size, leverage, operating costs, firm performance, operations of multinational firms) as well as cross-country factors that can influence corporate tax avoidance, such as tax rates, earnings volatility, and institutional factors. The presence of foreign ownership can also influence tax avoidance <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-42">(Suranta et al., 2020)</xref>. In Malaysia, as a developing country, the level of tax avoidance by multinational firms is closely related to the presence of foreign direct investment <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref>. Meanwhile, in other studies, foreign institutional ownership has a negative relationship with tax avoidance (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-35">(Pujiningsih &amp; Salsabyla, 2022)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-2">(Akbar et al., 2021)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-30">(Maisaroh &amp; Setiawan, 2021)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-22">(Idzni &amp; Purwanto, 2017)</xref>).</p><p>Based on the above description, this research will examine the influence of foreign ownership on the tax avoidance practices of firms in Indonesia. In addition, fundamental financial factors such as profitability, leverage, capital intensity, and firm size will be considered as control variables.</p></sec><sec><title>Literature Review and Hypothesis Development</title><p>Positive accounting theory explains the hypothesis that leads management to engage in earnings management. Based on the political cost hypothesis, firms lobby the government when legal or accounting standards reduce their profits (R. L. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-45">(Watts &amp; Zimmerman, 1978)</xref>). Based on the tax hypothesis, management makes discretionary decisions to choose accounting policies that can increase or decrease tax payments <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-46">(Watts &amp; Zimmerman, 1986)</xref>. Management strives to maximize the book value of the firm, but this may affect the firm's earnings. If a firm tries to manipulate tax rules to pay less tax, it can earn higher profits. This means that profits influence the company's tax policy.</p><sec><title>Tax Avoidance</title><p>Tax avoidance is considered an effort to reduce taxes through tax planning, both legally (tax avoidance) and illegally (tax evasion) <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-16">(Frank et al., 2009)</xref>. Tax avoidance is an effort to minimize the amount of tax paid by a company through a series of tax planning strategies <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-18">(Hanlon &amp; Heitzman, 2010)</xref>. A transaction can be described or referred to as tax avoidance when the company attempts to pay less tax than it should by taking advantage of the reasonable interpretation of tax regulations. The scheme of a series of transactions by paying attention to weaknesses in tax regulations in a country is an action called tax avoidance <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-13">(Dyreng et al., 2008)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-36">(Richardson et al., 2013)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-26">(Krisna, 2019)</xref>.</p><p><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> explained that tax avoidance has an impact on increasing profits and saving the company's cash from tax obligations that need to be paid. The firm value and dividends will increase with these savings. Based on the agency theory, large companies will utilize the company's resources to maximize the increase in agent performance compensation. The agents charged with running the firm's operations are responsible for creating a firm size that has increased profits. On the other hand, companies view taxes as an additional cost that has the potential to reduce company profits. For this reason, the company carries out systematic planning to minimize the taxes paid so that they do not reduce the real profits earned by the company.</p></sec><sec><title>Foreign Direct Investment</title><p>Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a structure in which parties from one country have capital or ownership of assets to exercise control over the production, distribution, and other activities of firms in other countries <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-32">(Moosa &amp; Cardak, 2003)</xref>. The United Nations World Investment Report, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), defines FDI as a long-term investment that results in the long-term interest and control of an economic entity in one country of origin in an entity in another country.</p><p>According to Law No. 25 of 2007 on Investment, foreign investment is the activity of capital investment for the purpose of conducting business in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which is carried out by foreign investors, whether using foreign capital solely or jointly with domestic investors. Meanwhile, foreign ownership structures can be individuals, legal entities, and/or foreign governments.</p><p>Foreign institutional ownership has been believed to be able to bring good practices to investment firms to improve and sustain firm quality <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-1">(Aggarwal et al., 2011)</xref>. This is an indication that foreign institutional investors have a significant influence on business decisions <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-28">(Luong et al., 2017)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-43">(Tsang et al., 2019)</xref>.</p><p>Foreign ownership structure in Indonesia is measured by the proportion of shares owned by foreign investors to the total outstanding shares of the firm (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-42">(Suranta et al., 2020)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-35">(Pujiningsih &amp; Salsabyla, 2022)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-49">(Yudanto &amp; Damayanti, 2022)</xref>). In addition, FDI can be measured by the proportion of foreign directors who influence the company <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref>.</p></sec><sec><title>Tax Avoidance dan Foreign Direct Investment</title><p>If a country sets a tax rate that is too high, it will reduce foreign investment from multinational companies and increase corporate tax planning <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-20">(Hong &amp; Smart, 2010)</xref>. This indicates that multinational companies tend to avoid taxes. Multinational companies that are classified as high-income companies have lower effective tax rates compared to domestic companies <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-4">(Atwood et al., 2012)</xref>. Therefore, tax avoidance cannot be said to be an ethical act because large companies may pay less tax compared to small companies.</p><p><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-19">(Hasan et al., 2022)</xref> found that foreign ownership has a negative impact on tax avoidance. This is due to geographical differences that increase asymmetric information. Foreign institutional investors often do not understand the tax regulations of the country in which they invest, including those related to tax avoidance <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-6">(Baik et al., 2013)</xref>. Technically, foreign institutional investors vote on the firm's involvement in aggressive tax avoidance, so they can prevent management decisions for high tax avoidance <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-19">(Hasan et al., 2022)</xref>. The presence of foreign parties in the ranks of shareholders puts pressure on management to reduce tax avoidance <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-30">(Maisaroh &amp; Setiawan, 2021)</xref>. Several other studies also show that foreign institutional ownership is negatively associated with tax avoidance (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-5">(Badertscher et al., 2013)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-35">(Pujiningsih &amp; Salsabyla, 2022)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-2">(Akbar et al., 2021)</xref>).</p><p>On the other hand, research findings by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-49">(Yudanto &amp; Damayanti, 2022)</xref>, and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-22">(Idzni &amp; Purwanto, 2017)</xref> indicate that foreign ownership does not have a significant effect on tax avoidance. A country's tax policy can increase foreign investment, which many countries often simultaneously use to limit multinational tax planning (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-8">(Blonigen &amp; Davies, 2002)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-20">(Hong &amp; Smart, 2010)</xref>.</p><p><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-24">(Khan et al., 2017)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-40">(Shi et al., 2020)</xref>, and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-3">(Alkurdi &amp; Mardini, 2020)</xref>, emphasized that foreign ownership has a positive impact on tax avoidance. These findings suggest that management will maintain good firm performance by avoiding taxes to satisfy interested owners, including foreign investors. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-33">(Nainggolan &amp; Sari, 2020)</xref> found that foreign directors with short-term interests have a positive effect on tax avoidance. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> found that foreign directors affect tax avoidance. Considering that Indonesia uses a two-tier system as regulated by Law No. 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Companies, the board of directors is divided into a board of commissioners (supervisors) and a board of directors (managers).</p><p>Based on the description above, this study hypothesizes the following:</p><p>H1: The amount of foreign ownership has a positive effect on tax avoidance.</p><p>H2: The foreign boards of commissioners have a positive effect on tax avoidance.</p><p>H3: The foreign boards of directors have a positive effect on tax avoidance.</p></sec></sec><sec><title>Research methods</title><p>This research uses quantitative methods to process and analyze data so that conclusions can be drawn in the form of relationships between observed variables. Indonesia was chosen as the population because Indonesia's tax ratio is still below the Asia-Pacific average tax ratio, while FDI into Indonesia is recorded as the second largest in Southeast Asia.</p><p>The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The criteria used are companies that are included in the IDX80 index category, and the company does not have a negative pre-tax income in 2018-2021. The IDX 80 Index is an index that includes the 80 most liquid stocks on the exchange. The index considers liquidity factors and fundamental factors such as financial condition and growth prospects, which are naturally of interest to investors <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-21">(IDXcoid, 2021)</xref>.</p><table-wrap id="table-1" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 1</label><caption><p>Sample Selection</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Criteria</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Firm-year Observation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Listed on IDX80 Index (2<sup>nd</sup> semester of 2021)</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">320</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Less:</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Firms-year that have negative Pre-tax Income</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">85</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Annual report that has incomplete data</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">13</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Final sample</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>The proxy used in this study to calculate tax avoidance is the book-tax difference (BTD). BTD is the difference between accounting profit (pre-tax income) and taxable income as reported in the financial statements. These differences arise due to different treatment in financial accounting standards and tax regulations. ETR was not used in this study because it has weaknesses when used with panel or time series data. ETR is measured only on an annual basis, which can lead to significant volatility. ETR also does not consider temporary book-tax differences <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-15">(Firmansyah et al., 2021)</xref>.</p><p>The company could increase its book income to show investors that its economic performance is strong. On the other hand, companies need to report taxable income to reduce their tax burden. This can be seen through the BTD proxy, which can indicate tax avoidance. Refer to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-27">(Lietz et al., 2013)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-39">(Saragih et al., 2021)</xref> the formula for calculating the book-tax difference (BTD) is as follows,</p><p>BTD<sub>i,t</sub> = PreTaxIni, t− <inline-formula><tex-math id="math-1"><![CDATA[ \documentclass{article} \usepackage{amsmath} \begin{document} \displaystyle \left( \frac{CurrTax\ i,t\ }{StatRate\ i,t} \right) \end{document} ]]></tex-math></inline-formula> then divided by Total Asetit</p><p>were,</p><p>BTD<sub>i,t</sub> = Book Tax Difference</p><p>PreTaxIni, t = Pre-tax income (accounting based)</p><p>CurrTaxi, t = Current tax expense</p><p>StatRatei, t = Corporate income tax rate in year t</p><p>The interests of foreign parties in this research represent foreign influence. This reflects the foreign direct investment made by a firm. In this research, the foreign influence variable is measured using a proxy adopted from <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref>.</p><p>First, foreign influence is measured by the proportion of foreign ownership divided by the total number of shares in the firm. The second proxy is the proportion of the board of directors. Considering that Indonesia has a two-tier system as regulated by Law No. 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Enterprises, the board of directors is divided into a board of commissioners (supervisors) and a board of directors (management). For this reason, the second proxy is measured by the proportion of the board of commissioners in the firm. The third proxy is seen from the proportion of the board of directors in the firm.</p><p>In addition to the dependent and independent variables observed as described above, fundamental financial factors such as profitability, leverage, capital intensity, and firm size are considered as control variables.</p><p>Profitability is the ability of a company to make a profit during a certain period <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-25">(Khan &amp; Nuryanah, 2023)</xref>. Profitability influences tax avoidance practices because it is used as a basis for calculating corporate income tax <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-14">(Fauzan et al., 2019)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-41">(Sunarto et al., 2021)</xref>. In this study, profitability is measured using the return on assets (ROA) ratio <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref>.</p><p>Leverage reflects the portion of financing that comes from debt. High leverage allows companies to incur higher interest costs. Increased interest costs will reduce corporate profits that are subject to taxation. Leverage is one of the factors that affect the tax policy of companies (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-14">(Fauzan et al., 2019)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-29">(Maharani &amp; Baroroh, 2019)</xref>). In this study, leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-9">(Chen et al., 2010)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref>.</p><p>A firm's capital investment is determined by its decision to finance itself by investing in the firm's assets to conduct its business and earn a profit. Capital intensity affects the firm's depreciation expense. Large assets result in high depreciation expenses for the firm. High depreciation expense will result in lower firm profits, so the income tax payable will be lower. In this study, capital intensity is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-9">(Chen et al., 2010)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref>.</p><p>Company size is a metric used to indicate the size of a company. It is important to control for variations in the level of company investment in assets with tax incentives <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> due to the possibility of differences in load recognition times <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-9">(Chen et al., 2010)</xref>. A larger company size typically indicates greater funding, which in turn may lead to higher return expectations. Management's desire for maximum profits can lead to the encouragement of tax avoidance, as highlighted by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-12">(Dewinta &amp; Setiawan, 2016)</xref>. This study measures company size using the natural logarithm of total assets <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref> to avoid extreme fluctuations in variable data compared to the sizes of other variables in this study.</p><table-wrap id="table-2" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 2</label><caption><p>Definition and measurement of the variables</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Proxy</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Formulation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Dependent variable</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"><p>BTD =</p><p>Book Tax Differences</p></td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"><inline-formula><tex-math id="math-2"><![CDATA[ \documentclass{article} \usepackage{amsmath} \begin{document} \displaystyle BTD_{i,t} = \frac{PreTaxIn_{i,t} - \left( \frac{CurrTax_{i,t}}{StatRate_{i,t}} \right)}{TotalAsset_{i,t}} \end{document} ]]></tex-math></inline-formula></td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="3" style="" align="left" valign="top">Independent variables</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign Ownership</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">The ratio of shares owned by foreign parties ÷ total company shares</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign BoC</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">The ratio of foreign Board of Commissioners to the number of BoCs in the company</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign BoD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">The ratio of foreign Board of Directors to the number of BoDs in the company</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="4" style="" align="left" valign="top">Control variables</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Profitability = ROA</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Net income ÷ total assets</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Lev = Leverage</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Long-term debt ÷ total assets</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">CapInt = Capital Intensity</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Fixed assets ÷ total assets</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"><p>FSize = Firm size</p><p>FAge = Firm Age</p></td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"><p>Log total assets</p><p>Log firm age</p></td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>To understand each studied variable, we first carry out descriptive data processing. A series of panel data estimation model tests were conducted, including the Chow test, Hausman test, and Lagrange test. These tests are used to determine the most appropriate regression model for the panel data at hand. Based on the results of the selected panel data regression estimation model, classical assumptions are tested, and hypotheses are tested.</p><p>This research employs the regression model described above.</p><p>BTD<sub>it</sub> = <inline-formula><tex-math id="math-3"><![CDATA[ \documentclass{article} \usepackage{amsmath} \begin{document} \displaystyle αi + β1foreign_ownit + β2foreign_BoCit + β3foreign_BoDit + β4profitabilityit + β5Capintit + β6levit + β7logFsizeit + β8logFageit + εit \end{document} ]]></tex-math></inline-formula></p></sec><sec><title>Results and Discussion</title><p><xref ref-type="table" rid="table-2fq8kn">Table 3</xref> presents descriptive statistics describing the characteristics of the research sample. Tax avoidance, as measured by the book-tax difference (BTD), has a maximum value of 0,1930 and a minimum value of -0,3672. A positive value means that the pre-tax income according to the accounting books is higher than the taxable income. The median value of 0,0006 shows that there are still more companies that have a high BTD or can be said to practice tax avoidance. The standard deviation of BTD is 0,0488 while the mean is -0,0010. The standard deviation is greater than the average, which indicates that the distribution of the book-tax difference variable is heterogeneous or varied.</p><p>The foreign ownership ratio has the lowest value of 0,0013 (0,13%), which means that all public companies included in the IDX80 index have foreign investors. The lowest value is owned by PT Kimia Farma Tbk, which is a state-owned company. The highest percentage of foreign ownership was 93,10%, namely PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk in 2020.</p><p>The highest ratio of foreign board of commissioners is 0,75, which means that 75% of the board of commissioners are foreign nationals. The highest ratio is owned by Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk but the highest number is owned by Astra International Tbk. The average composition of the Board of Commissioners is 10,68%, which indicates that the position of the Board of Commissioners is small in Indonesia.</p><p>Meanwhile, the highest ratio of foreign boards of directors is 0,67, which means 67% of the board of directors are foreign nationals. The highest ratio is owned by H.M. Sampoerna Tbk at the same time as the highest number of foreign boards of directors. Overall, the proportion of foreign Board of Directors is even lower with an average of 9,90%.</p><table-wrap id="table-2fq8kn" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 3</label><caption><p>Descriptive Statistics</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Variable</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Ob</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Maximum</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Min</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Mean</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Median</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Std. Dev.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Dependent variable</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">BTD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1930</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,3672</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0010</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0006</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0488</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Independent variables</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign_Ownership</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,9310</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0013</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,2822</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,2234</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,2631</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign_BoC</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,7500</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1068</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1979</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Foreign_BoD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,6667</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0990</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1571</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Control variable</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Profitability</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,4468</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0006</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0799</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0593</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0730</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Capint</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">3,5629</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0082</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3502</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3145</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3127</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Leverage</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,6749</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0027</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,2048</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1698</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1523</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FIRM_AGE (Year)</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">39</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">19</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">18</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">10</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FIRM_SIZE (In Million Rupiah)</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">367.311.000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">758.844</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">46.505.733</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">26.297.460</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">60.184.022</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Profitability has an average value of 0,0799 with a standard deviation of 0,730. This value indicates that, on average, the companies included in the IDX80 Index have relatively competitive profitability. A positive minimum profitability value ensures that the sample in the study does not have a negative pre-tax profit. The highest profitability is led by PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk in 2018, 2019, and 2020. This also shows that the non-cyclical consumer industry sector was able to survive the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic wave.</p><p>Capital intensity has an average value of 0,3502 and a standard deviation of 0,3127. Similarly, leverage has a mean of 0,2048 and a standard deviation of 0,1698. Both show a lower standard deviation than the average, which means that capital intensity and leverage in companies included in the IDX80 index have relatively standard values.</p><p>The firm age in the descriptive statistics is explained based on the age of the company from the time of its IPO to the year the financial report was prepared. The oldest is 39 years old in 2021, namely PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk. Meanwhile, the youngest company is PT Buyung Poetra Sembada Tbk (HOKI), which has only been registered since June 2017. In testing the regression model later, the company age uses the log value so that it does not have a value that is too unequal to other ratio variables.</p><p>The firm size in this descriptive statistical table is explained based on the total value of the firm's assets in millions of rupiah. The highest value is owned by PT Astra International Tbk in 2021 with a value of IDR 367,3 trillion, while the lowest value is owned by PT Buyung Poetra Sembada Tbk with a value of IDR 758,8 billion. In testing the regression model later, company age uses the log value so that it does not have a value that is too unbalanced with other ratio variables.</p><p>The results of testing the accuracy of the selection of the panel data regression model are presented in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table-84grqy">Table 4</xref>.</p><table-wrap id="table-84grqy" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 4</label><caption><p>Pemilihan Model Regresi Panel</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="2" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Variable</th><th colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Common Effect Model</th><th colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Fixed Effect Model</th><th colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Random Effect Model</th></tr><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Koefisien</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">t-statistic</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Koefisien</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">t-statistic</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">Koefisien</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="middle">t-statistic</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">C</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1475</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">2,9482</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0004</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0017</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1088</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,4577</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0156</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,0435</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0977</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">2,7168***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0464</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">2,2886**</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_BOC</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0032</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,1535</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0165</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,4414</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0130</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,5213</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_BOD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0184</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,8801</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0103</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,1936</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0281</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,9805</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">PROFITABILITY</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0513</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,1166</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1703</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">2,6290***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1222</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">2,4153**</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">CAPINT</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0828</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-8,7562***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0726</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-7,5329***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0817</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-9,9608***</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LEVERAGE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0378</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,5952</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0125</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3428</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0223</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,8342</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFSIZE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0215</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-2,7771***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0117</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3630</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0108</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,9410</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFIRMAGE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0212</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,7012*</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0897</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-2,5568**</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0213</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-1,1869</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F-statistic</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">10,9622</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Prob = 0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">10,6116</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Prob = 0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">14,6317</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Prob = 0,0000</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Adj. R-squared</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top">0,2650</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top">0,7473</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top">0,3304</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="2" style="" align="left" valign="top">Choosing the Best Panel Regression Model</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top">Chow test</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top"><p>Hausman test</p></td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="bottom"><p>Lagrange multiplier test</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top"><p>Cross-section F. 7,7753</p><p>d.f. (60,153),</p><p>Chi-square Prob. 0,0000</p></td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top"><p>Cross-section Rand. (d.f.) </p><p>14,7607 (8) </p><p>Prob. 0,0640</p></td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top"><p>Cross-section Breusch-</p><p>Pagan 90,6904 </p><p>Prob. 0,0000</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Conclusion</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top"><p>Fixed Effect Model</p></td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="bottom"><p>Random Effect Model</p></td><td colspan="2" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="bottom"><p>Random Effect Model</p></td></tr></tbody></table><table-wrap-foot><p><italic>Notes:</italic> <italic>significance at level p&lt;0,1 ; *p&lt;0,05 ; ***p&lt;0,01</italic></p></table-wrap-foot></table-wrap><p>The results of the Chow test show that the probability value of the chi-square cross section is 0,0000. At the confidence level (α = 95%), it is concluded that FEM is more appropriate than CEM. Next, the results of Hausman's test show that the probability value of the random cross-section is 0,0640. This value is greater than α 0,05, so it can be concluded that it is more appropriate to use REM rather than FEM. The next step in selecting the best model is to perform a Lagrange multiplier test. Based on the Lagrange multiplier test, it can be concluded that it is more appropriate to use REM than CEM. Thus, of the three best panel regression model test results above, REM is the most appropriate to use at the α level of 0,05.</p><table-wrap id="table-vo0n0d" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 5</label><caption><p>Correlation matrix among the independent and the control variables.</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Correlation</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_OWN</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_BOC</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_BOD</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">PROF</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">CAPINT</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LEV</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFSIZE</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFIRMAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_OWN</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_BOC</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,627</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F_BOD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,374</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,427</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">PROF</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,215</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,146</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,236</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">CAPINT</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,058</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,009</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,094</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,063</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LEV</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,006</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,239</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,051</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,424</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,206</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFSIZE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,265</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,214</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,017</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,207</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,057</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,324</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFIRMAGE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,354</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,266</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,082</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,059</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,088</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,083</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,597</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,000</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Hypothesis testing in this research was carried out after the classical assumption test was satisfied. The classical multicollinearity assumption test was carried out to show that there is no correlation between the independent variables that exceed 0,8 <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-17">(Ghozali, 2017)</xref>.<xref ref-type="table" rid="table-vo0n0d">Table 5</xref> shows the results of the multicollinearity test, and it can be seen that the highest value is only 0,62. Therefore, the data in this study did not experience multicollinearity problems.</p><p>Based on the panel regression model that was selected and passed the classical assumption test for panel data, the results of regressing the random effects model are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table-m1e42y">Table 6</xref> below. The F-statistic test results show a Prob (F-statistic) value of 0,0000 or less than the α value of 0,05. This shows that the independent variables and control variables can simultaneously influence the dependent variable (tax avoidance) in the company. This research model is suitable to be tested using regression.</p><table-wrap id="table-m1e42y" ignoredToc=""><label>Table 6</label><caption><p>Results of the hypothesis test with REM</p></caption><table frame="box" rules="all"><thead><tr><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Variable</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Coefficient</th><th colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Prob.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">C</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1088</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1464</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0464**</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0231</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_BOC</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0130</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,6027</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">FOREIGN_BOD</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0281</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3280</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">PROFITABILITY</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,1222**</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0166</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">CAPINT</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0817***</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LEVERAGE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0223</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,4051</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFIRMAGE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0213</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,2366</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">LOGFSIZE</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">-0,0108</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3478</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3" rowspan="1" style="" align="center" valign="top">Dependent variable = BTD</td></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Adj. R-square</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,3304</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Durbin-Watson stat</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">1,9321</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">F-statistic</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">14,6318</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">Prob</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top">0,0000</td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="" align="left" valign="top"/></tr></tbody></table><table-wrap-foot><p>Keterangan: p&lt;0,1 ; *p&lt;0,05 ; ***p&lt;0,01</p></table-wrap-foot></table-wrap><p>Based on <xref ref-type="table" rid="table-m1e42y">Table 6</xref>, it is known that the adjusted R square of this model is 0,3304. This shows that the independent variable can explain 33,04% of the tax avoidance measured by BTD, while the rest is explained by other variables outside this research.</p><p>Foreign ownership has a positive effect (α&lt;0,05) on tax avoidance with a coefficient of 0,0464. This means that the higher the composition of foreign investors, the higher the tendency of the firm to engage in tax avoidance. These results suggest that management will maintain good corporate performance by reporting high pre-tax income but lower taxable income to avoid taxes. This is to satisfy interested owners, including foreign investors. These results are in line with previous studies conducted by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-38">(Salihu et al., 2015)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-24">(Khan et al., 2017)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-40">(Shi et al., 2020)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-3">(Alkurdi &amp; Mardini, 2020)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-33">(Nainggolan &amp; Sari, 2020)</xref>.</p><p>Meanwhile, foreign boards of directors and foreign boards of commissioners do not affect tax avoidance. These results suggest that the number of directors or commissioners does not necessarily affect a firm's tax policy. They do not aggressively exploit the differences between tax and accounting rules. Given that the companies included in the IDX80 index are companies that are of primary interest to investors, it is even more important to maintain the company's reputation. Research by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-42">(Suranta et al., 2020)</xref> also found no evidence of the influence of foreign commissioners on tax avoidance practices. The regulations on access to financial information for tax purposes (AEOI), which came into effect in August 2017, as regulated in PMK number PMK-70/PMK.03/2018, may also support the findings of this research.</p><p>The control variable in this research, namely profitability, shows a significance value of 0,0166 (α&lt;0,05) with a coefficient of 0,1222, which proves that the profitability ratio has a positive effect on tax avoidance. This result is consistent with the research findings of Richardson et al. (2013b) which state that the profitability ratio has a positive effect on tax avoidance practices. Meanwhile, capital intensity in this study shows a negative effect on tax avoidance. These results suggest that the lower the capital intensity, the more aggressive the tax avoidance. The capital intensity variable is related to depreciation costs, which may affect the amount of taxes paid. These results are consistent with the research of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="BIBR-48">(Yuanita et al., 2020)</xref>. This research cannot show that the leverage ratio, firm age, and firm size affect tax avoidance.</p></sec><sec><title>Conclusion</title><p>The results of this research show that foreign ownership has an impact on tax avoidance. The higher the value of shares or investments owned by foreign parties, the higher the book-tax difference value. This is evidence that companies with foreign direct investment may be able to minimize their tax burden due to the complexity of regulatory differences.</p><p>Meanwhile, the number of foreign directors and the number of foreign commissioners does not affect tax avoidance. This shows that the tax policy of the company does not depend on the number of directors. This research is limited to dividing the number of foreign directors by the total number of directors, but it does not consider whether the position is that of a finance director or similar positions that influence the company's tax policy. To overcome this limitation, future research could consider looking at specific positions of foreign directors or using audit committee variables that are directly related to financial reporting.</p><p>With purposive sampling, it is possible that the data obtained may not be fully representative of the population of all types of firms. Therefore, further research is needed beyond the IDX80 index.</p><p>This research may contribute to positive accounting theory. Shareholders want managers to be able to increase their wealth. For this reason, managers use policy discretion to choose accounting methods that can reduce the tax burden but still show a high book value. 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