Disclosure of financial reports regarding complete and transparent information is needed so as not to cause wrong interpretation (Agoes & Ardana, 2009). One of the information presented in the report corporate finance is information about related party transactions or related party transactions (RPT). In Indonesia, according to the statement of financial accounting standards (PSAK) number 7 of 2014 concerning disclosure of related parties. Parties are considered related when one party has the ability to control the other party or has significant influence over the other party in making financial and operational decisions. Knowledge of the entity's transactions, outstanding balances, including commitments, and relationships with related parties can influence the assessment of its operations by users of financial statements, including the assessment of risks and opportunities faced by the entity (IAS 24) .

(Kang et al., 2014) stated that related party transactions are transfers of resources, services, or obligations from the reporting entity to related parties, which usually refer to executives, boards of directors, and major shareholders. Moscairello (2011) states that related party transactions are used by related parties as an efficient tool for internal transactions within the company . (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010) stated that related party transactions can categorized as a related party transaction detrimental (abusive related party transaction) and profitable (efficient related party transaction )

In Indonesia with a concentrated ownership pattern and the main owner The dominant (ultimate control ) is family (Arifin, 2003) . Previous research in Indonesia found that related party transactions are in line with family ownership ((Barokah, 2013); Dyanty et al 2013, (Nuritomo et al., 2020); (Ernawati & Aryani, 2019)) and concentrated ownership (Apriani, 2015; Utama; 2015). (Claessens & , 1999) found that more than 50% of companies in Indonesia are controlled by families. According to a 2014 Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) survey, more than 95% of companies in Indonesia are family businesses. In family firms, greater agency conflicts occur between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2005).

Sanchez (2016) stated that family ownership can add to the value of the company. (Maury, 2006) reports that family-owned firms increase firm profitability, and the legal environment protects the interests of minority shareholders. (Cheng, 2014) stated that the founding family cares about the family's reputation. Furthermore, (Barokah, 2013) stated that related party transactions family companies have benefits and are more transparent in disclosing related party transactions in order to maintain their reputation. Likewise, (Nuritomo et al., 2020) in his research found that the higher the family ownership, the lower the positive influence of the shareholder tax burden on related party transactions because they have to maintain a big name or avoid tax problems in the future.

(Hu et al., 2012) state that information is owned by family ownership as a controlling shareholder as a means carry out expropriation which is detrimental to minority shareholders. (Kohlbeck et al., 2018) provide evidence that family firms use their power to benefit from minority shareholders. Berto (2019) found ownership was reported to have a positive effect on tunneling. That is, the more concentrated the shareholders are in accordance with indications of expropriation. Likewise Abdullatif et al (2019) stated that companies with high concentration of ownership can use RPT in tunneling activities to take over funds to dominant shareholders. (Mohammed, 2019) and Dyanty et al (2013) which state that related party transactions will get stronger with family ownership. (Chee Yoong et al., 2015) examined Malaysian companies using panel data stating that related party transactions in family firms reduces the value of the firm, expropriation through related party transactions is stronger in family companies compared to non-family companies. (Azima et al., 2018) examines the main shareholders of companies owned by Pakistani families who take over resources through related party transactions. The results of the study concluded that there is a relationship between the concentration of family shareholders and the exploitation of the interests of minority shareholders.

related party transaction activities with political connections to get protection in these activities. Having political connections exacerbate type II agency conflict in which the majority shareholder takes advantage position in the company for their own interests without prioritizing the shareholders minority shares (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). According to (Ling et al., 2016) stated that from the perspective of agency theory, companies that are politically connected have the potential for related party transactions. Ismail et al (2022) researched that many Egyptian companies are still connected to political boards of directors and political relations have a significant effect on related party transactions. (Supatmi et al., 2021) state that political connections strengthen the effect of related party transactions on company value. (Habib et al., 2017) found that there was a positive effect political connections to related party transactions. Connected company politics will carry out related party transactions. In contrast, Abdullatif et al.'s research. (2019) stated Jordan found that there was no influence between political connections and related party transactions.

This study includes corporate governance variables as a moderating variable. Corporate governance will examine oversight mechanisms that can guarantee minority rights, namely by implementing corporate governance within the company (Lin, 2014). Utama (2015) states that good governance reduces transfer price manipulation and RPT is abusive. (Fan & Wong, 2002) stated one of the ways to mitigate these agency problems is by implementing a good and effective corporate governance system.

This research focuses on companies in Indonesia in the mining sector because there are several cases of related party transactions that have occurred in this sector, such as PT. Sumalindo Lestari Jaya, PT. Adaro, PT. Cakra Minerals and PT. Bumi Resources, some of which are family companies and mining companies, were chosen because a mining company is a company that manages resources and economic transactions involving many parties, namely stakeholders (suppliers, creditors, consumers, investors, etc.). Companies that carry out economic activities that involve many parties tend to pose a lot of risks so that they are expected to have a relationship with risk disclosures carried out by the company so that this becomes the motivation for researchers to make a sample of observations of mining sector companies in this study.

Research conducted by Dyanty et al (2013) shows that family ownership uses RPT as a tool to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. (Azima et al., 2018) examined the main shareholders of Pakistani family-owned companies. The research concludes that there is a relationship between concentration of family shareholders and the exploitation of the interests of minority shareholders. The same result was obtained by (Amzaleg & Barak, 2012) that there is a negative effect of family companies on the value of related party transactions, family companies tend to conduct tunneling transactions and are practically a form of personal gain from control consumption. (Mohammed, 2019) states that related party transactions will get stronger with family ownership in Turkey. Furthermore, (Chee Yoong et al., 2015) examined Malaysian companies using panel data stating that related party transactions in family firms reduces firm value. (Kohlbeck et al., 2018) examined the influence of family firms on related party transactions that family firms use their power to benefit minority shareholders. Berto's research (2019) reports that concentration of ownership has a positive effect on tunneling. That is, the more concentrated the shareholders are in accordance with indications of expropriation. Likewise Abdullatif et al (2019) stated that companies with high concentration of ownership can use RPT in tunneling activities to take over funds to dominant shareholders.

On the other hand, different results have been shown by several studies, including by (Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin, 2015). The results of their research show that family-controlled companies limit the opportunistic effects of related party transactions on real earnings management, thereby supporting the alignment effect of family ownership. This study strengthens the notion that family firms in Malaysia do not experience an entrenchment effect and supports the notion of alignment. Furthermore, (Bansal & Thenmozhi, 2020) found that concentrated founder ownership in India is more likely to encourage related party transactions that are beneficial to minority shareholders compared to related party transactions that lead to takeovers. These results are in line with (Barokah, 2013) found that related party transactions in family companies have benefits and are more transparent in disclosing related party transactions in order to maintain their reputation. Likewise, (Nuritomo et al., 2020) in his research found that the higher the family ownership, the lower the positive influence of the shareholder tax burden on related party transactions because they have to maintain a big name or avoid tax problems in the future. Family companies tend not to carry out related party transactions for tax purposes because they have high tax risk considerations. These results are supported by research by (Alhadab et al., 2020) which shows that there is no effect of family ownership on related party transaction relationships.

Research by Hu et al (2015) found the size of related party transactions to be negatively related with corporate governance using a proxy proportion of directors indicating the need for improvement of corporate governance in China. (Yeh et al., 2012) examined corporate governance relationships using the CGI index. The empirical results show that good corporate governance is effective in limiting related party transactions of various related party transaction sizes. (Azima et al., 2018) concluded that there is a negative relationship between corporate governance and the concentration of major shareholders exploiting the interests of minority shareholders. (Agnihotri & Bhattacharya, 2019) show that ownership concentration negatively moderates the impact of governance variables on related party transactions. (Alhadab et al., 2020) states the weakness of the corporate governance system or the limited separation between company ownership and management in Jordan, so that the effects of related party transactions are worse, compared to the context in more developed countries. Hamid et al (2015) stated that corporate governance is a proxy for audit committees and independent directors. The higher the number of audit committees and independent directors, the lower the takeover of the interests of minority shareholders. Pebri et al (2020) stated that corporate governance with audit committee and board of commissioners proxies has an effect on related party transactions. The more independent commissioners and audit committees the better the supervision will be so that it will improve financial performance and increase compliance with related party transactions. Likewise the research of Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004), Hwang (2010), Yeh et al. (2012), and Utama and Utama (2014) state that corporate governance influences related party transactions.

Several previous studies have examined the influence between political connections and related party transactions. (Ismail et al., 2022) researched that many Egyptian companies are still connected to political boards of directors and political relations have a significant effect on related party transactions. (Supatmi et al., 2021) state that political connections strengthen the effect of related party transactions on company value. (Habib et al., 2017) found that there was a positive effect political connections to related party transactions. Connected company politics will carry out related party transactions. In contrast, Abdullatif et al.'s research. (2019) stated Jordan found that there was no influence between political connections and related party transactions.

This research is a quantitative research. Quantitative research is data that is collected as secondary data in the form of numbers or qualitative data that is calculated and obtained from books, reports or websites (Sugiyono, 2003). The secondary data used in this study comes from the annual financial reports of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) as well as secondary data obtained from the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange ( www.idx.go.id ) in 2016 – 2021.

The population used in this study are mining companies listed on the IDX for the 2016-2021 period. Determination of the sample in this study using a purposive sampling method in which the sample used must meet certain predetermined requirements. The criteria set are mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2016-2021 period, The final number of samples used in the study is presented in the following table:

Related party transactions (RPT) as measured using the sum of related party transactions of sales, purchases, payables and receivables divided by total assets in this study have an average of 0.056 with a maximum and minimum value of 0.781 and 0, respectively. related party with a maximum value of 0.781 indicates that the level of related party transactions practiced is high, around 78%. This indicates that the sample firms In this study, the practice of related party transactions is carried out from several aspects of transactions such as debts and receivables to achieve certain goals. However, there are also those who do not conduct transactions with related parties in certain years

Family ownership (FAMILY) has an average value of 0.344 with a maximum and minimum value of 0.925 and 0 respectively because there are companies that are not owned by families . Family ownership with an average value of 34% is still high because family ownership refers to PSAK No. 15 that the majority shareholding of the company is more than 20% and minority owners have less than 20% share ownership of the company which shows that the family or the founder of the company still dominates the majority percentage of Indonesian capital ownership.

Corporate governance (GCG) has an average value of 70.407 with a maximum and minimum value of 83.00 0 and 51.312 respectively. This shows that the average value of corporate governance is 72.044%, which means that mining corporate governance in Indonesia is good.

This research aims to examine the relationship between family ownership and political connections with related party transactions moderated by corporate governance and to see the relationship between family ownership levels and related party transactions in mining companies in 2016-2021. Data analysis carried out shows that the average family ownership of mining companies in Indonesia is 34.46%. As is known, according to PSAK No. 15 regarding share ownership, that investors are considered to have significant influence if they have either directly or indirectly through company share ownership 20% or more of the investee's voting rights. It can be concluded that the majority of mining companies in Indonesia are owned by families. The research results show that family ownership has a significant positive effect on related party transactions in line with research by (Azima et al., 2018), (Amzaleg & Barak, 2012), (Mohammed, 2019), Cheyoong et al (2015), (Kohlbeck et al., 2018), Munir (2011), Berto (2019), Abdullatif et al (2019), (Ernawati & Aryani, 2019), (Yeh et al., 2012), Dyanty et al (2013). Political connections have a positive effect on related party transactions. Political connections have a positive effect on related party transactions, in line with research by (Habib et al., 2017), (Santosa & Nugrahanti, 2022), (Rahman & Nugrahanti, 2021). Companies that have political connections will carry out related party transactions to transfer resources outside the company. Furthermore, the research results show that GCG in mining companies in Indonesia can weaken the influence of family ownership and political connections on related party transactions in line with research by Hamid et al (2015), Utama et al (2015), (Yeh et al., 2012), Ali et al (2019), (Sari & Putri, 2014), (Maharti & Nugrahanti, 2022).

This research has several limitations. First, this research only focuses on mining companies in Indonesia. Based on this, further research needs to explore more broadly by taking samples of other corporate sectors in Indonesia. Second , future research is expected to try newer and more detailed measurements of corporate governance and follow the latest regulations regarding corporate governance, especially in more complex mining companies. Third, it is hoped that future research will focus on the sample data that will be examined, namely family ownership, because in this study the researchers did not focus on family ownership of mining companies in Indonesia, but used data on all mining companies in Indonesia. Fourth, this study only focuses on communication media in the form of annual reports. Even though the annual report is used by stakeholders as the main source of information for decision making, it is likely that management also uses other communication mechanisms for disclosure of social responsibility such as. Therefore, future research may consider disclosure in other media such as newspapers or advertisements.