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## UNDERSTANDING THE DISCOURSE OF RADICALISM (CRITICAL APPROACH)

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**Abstract:** *Radicalism is an issue that is often identified with the religious thoughts and practices of Muslims. Even though the narrative of radicalism is claimed to be a neutral term various scientific studies, media reports, and public opinion tend to direct these radical accusations against certain Islamic understandings and certain Muslims. Using a qualitative descriptive method, this research tries to explain radicalism with various critical perspectives. Therefore, the term radicalism is studied in depth both from the terminology meaning and the development of meaning that occurs in the term radicalism. The results of the study show: that first, radicalism is not an Islamic terminology but a term that emerged from the West to characterize certain groups of Western society. Second, academically, the term radicalism is a neutral term and even tends to be positive. This term becomes negative because it is ridden by political interests. Third, every religion has a radical character, which has principal and basic teachings.*

**Keywords:** *radical, politics, islamophobia, critical approach, Muslims*

### INTRODUCTION

This country is not doing well. Many people in Indonesia are starting to realize this condition. The mass media reports a lot about the state of this country which is far from the ideals and expectations of society. Corruption crimes, for example, are still mostly committed by officials. In fact, according to ICW, history will record that the eradication of corruption was destroyed at the hands of the current government. The indicators are, first, the sluggish performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The Corruption Eradication Committee has a large number of unresolved debt cases. Second, violations of the code of ethics committed by KPK leaders [1]–[6].

In addition, SOEs, which were expected to have a positive impact on the country's economy, actually went bankrupt. As much as 68% of SOEs received capital injections from the government. All are potentially bankrupt. One of the triggers for this bankruptcy, according to Rizal Ramli, was a conflict of interest and the influx of unqualified human

resources in the ranks of commissioners and directors, which made the average BUMN unable to compete with the private sector and foreign companies. However, the bankruptcy of BUMN is the reason for the entry of private investors, local and foreign [\[7\]–\[11\]](#).

The same goes for land ownership. Indonesia, which has a vast homeland, is only controlled by a handful of conglomerates. The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) notes that land tenure is currently increasingly unequal, especially related to the strength of capital from large corporations. Based on KPA's latest data, 68 per cent of land throughout mainland Indonesia is currently controlled by one per cent of business groups and large-scale corporate bodies. The rest is then contested by the remaining 99 per cent of the community. On the other hand, as an agrarian country, it turns out that in Indonesia many farmers do not own land or are limited to being farm labourers.

The government's efforts to build infrastructure were not well planned. A lot of infrastructure is stalled or threatened to stall. Deputy Head of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), Ikmal Lukman said that there are still many stalled investment projects to date. In his data, there are 24 stalled projects worth IDR 708 trillion. Even though the existing projects are financed with debt. As stated in the attachment to the Decree of the Minister of PPN/Head of Bappenas Number KEP.65/M.PPN/HK/06/2020, there are 31 projects financed with foreign debt. The entire project requires a debt loan of US\$ 5.04 billion or the equivalent of IDR 73.22 trillion (exchange rate of IDR 14,500 per US dollar) and a US\$ 545.56 million or IDR 7.91 trillion matching loan.

On the other hand, some of these projects have been sold or are planning to be sold to private or foreign hands, such as several toll roads as discussed by the government. PT Waskita Karya Tbk (WSKT) stated that it will divest all of its toll road assets until 2025 because the construction of this toll road creates a large debt burden for the company. The debt incurred by this toll road investment is at least Rp 53 trillion-Rp 54 trillion. Foreign debt is also piling up to reach thousands of trillions of rupiah. By the end of 2021, the government's debt has reached IDR 6,713.24 trillion.

Not to mention, the impact caused by the state's economic management system which is not in favour of the people. For example, the price of people's basic needs is getting more expensive. The latest on the price of cooking oil. Even though this country is the largest palm oil producer in the world [\[12\]–\[17\]](#).

In the business world, many small and medium-scale entrepreneurs are in a slump. As a result, there were many layoffs which increased the unemployment rate. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the poverty rate also increased. According to data from the statistics centre, the poverty rate has increased to 2.7 million due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid these downturns, the government has even approved plans to move the new capital city to Kalimantan, with a planned cost of hundreds of trillions of rupiah from the state budget. According to Bappenas (the national development planning agency), it is estimated that the construction of the IKN will spend funds of 466.9 trillion. The tax burden certainly has an impact on increasing the people's burden [\[18\]–\[23\]](#).

Various problems faced by this nation and state must certainly be sought for a solution. If not, this problem will burden the Indonesian state and people, causing hereditary problems that are difficult to control. Unfortunately, amid the problems that engulf this country, what is always being questioned is radicalism which continues to be tried and used as a scapegoat to cover up the failure of the regime in power with its capitalist system in managing the country. This situation is allegedly a big project and is planned to lead world opinion to oppress Muslims [\[24\]–\[26\]](#).

The massive policies and official statements about the narrative of radicalism are identified with Islamic teachings and people seem to want to emphasize that the main problem of this nation is radicalism. In other words, the solution to all this adversity—

poverty, corruption, the bankruptcy of BUMNs, the accumulation of foreign debts, the large number of unemployed, and so on, is to eradicate radicalism. If formerly communism was scapegoated by the New Order regime, that scapegoat has now changed to the name of radicalism and terrorism [27]–[29].

Even though radicalism has very strong political interests, not a few or even the majority of scientific studies view radicalism in the lines that have been determined by policymakers. Academics should be able to look at various problems from a scientific point of view and analysis that is straight, not inclined to the right, left, or upwards. Based on the problems above, the researcher feels the need to comprehensively analyze the problem of radicalism. It is hoped that this research can enrich the reader's perspective in understanding a creature called radicalism.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

**Table 1. Literature Review on Understanding the Discourse of Radicalism**

Author(s) & Year	Title of Work	Key Concepts	Findings/Contributions
Van Dijk	<i>Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis</i>	Macrostructure, microstructure, superstructure in discourse	Focuses on how radical ideologies are embedded in text and communication. Identifies the underlying power relations.
Fairclough	<i>Language and Power</i>	Discourse, power relations, ideology	Explores how language shapes and reinforces radical ideologies in sociopolitical contexts.
Wodak & Meyer	<i>Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis</i>	Discourse-historical approach, ideology, power dynamics	Analyzes the historical continuity of radical discourse through the lens of sociopolitical changes.
Sageman	<i>Understanding Terror Networks</i>	Radicalization process, social networks, ideology	Explains how social and online networks facilitate radical ideologies. Highlights online media's role in spreading radicalism.
Alvares & Dahlgren (2016)	<i>Populism, Media, and Radical Discourse</i>	Media representation, radical discourse, populism	Explores the role of online media in amplifying radical voices and shaping public perception of radicalism.
Jackson (2007)	<i>The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies</i>	Radicalism, terrorism, discourse analysis	Challenges the traditional discourse of terrorism by analyzing language, power, and representation.
O'Halloran	<i>Critical Discourse Analysis and Media Texts</i>	Media discourse, ideology, representation	Investigates how radical ideologies are visually and textually represented in media texts.
Richardson	<i>Analyzing Newspapers: An Approach from CDA</i>	Media discourse, radicalism, representation	Studies how newspapers frame radical groups and ideologies, affecting public opinion.
Wiktorowicz	<i>Radical Islam</i>	Ideology,	Discusses the role of ideology

	<i>Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West</i>	radicalization, Islam, extremism	and discourse in shaping radical Muslim extremism in Western societies.
Zizek	<i>Violence</i>	Ideological state apparatus, discourse of violence, radicalism	Analyzes the underlying ideology of radical groups and the discourse that justifies violent acts.

## METHODOLOGY

This research uses a descriptive qualitative approach. The data sources used include heritage sources, namely books, journals, and magazines that discuss radicalism. Meanwhile, regarding social and political empirical conditions, the focus is on online media sources, namely all types of communication channels that exist on the internet or can only be accessed with an internet connection. Online media is also called online media [30], [31].

After the data is collected, then the data is analyzed using a critical analysis approach, namely careful examination and evaluation, drawings or work, and other performance. Critical analysis is a way to try to understand the reality of events or events and statements that are behind the clear meaning or direct meaning. According to Van Dick, critical discourse analyzes text from the three elements that make up the text, namely macrostructure, microstructure, and superstructure [32]–[35].

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**Table 2. Research Methods**

Aspect	Details
<b>Research Approach</b>	Descriptive qualitative approach
<b>Data Sources</b>	- Heritage sources: Books, journals, magazines (discussing radicalism) - Online media sources: Communication channels accessible via the internet
<b>Analysis Method</b>	Critical analysis approach
<b>Critical Analysis</b>	A method of examining and evaluating events or statements beyond their direct meaning or surface-level interpretation
<b>Elements of Critical Discourse (Van Dijk)</b>	- <b>Macrostructure:</b> Overall theme or topic of the text - <b>Microstructure:</b> Detailed linguistic features of the text - <b>Superstructure:</b> Organizational structure of the text

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Recognizing Radicalism

Radicalism is not an Islamic terminology. This term was first introduced by Charles James Fox who declared radical reforms in 1797. Radicalism is often defined as a school of thought that seeks social and political change or renewal by violent or drastic and revolutionary means. Based on this definition, radicalism does not have a gender, right or wrong considering that social change occurs naturally every time, either gradually or drastically [39], [40].

If the expected change is believed by the whole community as a good change, then in this case radicalism should not be viewed negatively. In fact, according to Roberts and Bradley, the vision proposed by a charismatic leader often involves radical changes, and these changes may be more acceptable to the public during a crisis. Charismatic leaders may also be more motivated to propose their vision for radical change during times of crisis when they are more likely to be accepted and these changes may be more acceptable to the public during crises [41], [42].

Viewed from a religious perspective, radicalism is a religious understanding that refers to very basic religious foundations. Viewed from this aspect, every religion has a radical character because it has basic principles that must be believed by every adherent [43], [44].

Politically, the term radicalism was initially only identified with any person or movement that uses violence to achieve goals. As stated by Mark, what is meant by radicalism is a movement that has an old-fashioned view and often uses violence in teaching their beliefs. They like to commit acts of terror, meaning to frighten or cause fear. Unfortunately, the violence that is widely associated with Islamic figures and movements cannot be separated from the external role of the Muslims themselves. On a macro level, acts of terrorism and radicalism do not arise purely from the womb of Islam but are the result of Western social engineering driven by the United States. Besides that, the old-fashioned term that the West attaches to Muslims who adhere to Islamic teachings is a form of Western contempt for Islam [45].

Recently, the meaning of radicalism has shifted. Radicalism is not only related to violent means used to achieve goals but also pinned on people or groups who aspire to implement Islamic law even if they are not pursued using violence. Because of this, those who oppose the idea of an Islamic-based state categorize any organization that has the goal of implementing Islamic law, they call it radical. Even from a theoretical perspective, radicalism has nothing to do with violence and is not related to any particular religious group. If it's just a philosophical level and understanding, of course, it doesn't matter because it doesn't cause damage [46].

According to Gusti, the phenomenon of the spread of radicalism in Indonesia can be seen from a socio-political and economic perspective. In social and political analysis, radicalism is thought to arise due to circumstances and objective conditions. First, the lack of justice and freedom strengthened the dominant system of political and financial power. The allegation is that the development of radicalism is due to the strengthening of injustice and lack of freedom in politics and the economy. Second, the emergence of radicalism due to the gap in inequality in the public eye raises concerns about the future which can lead to fanaticism or loss of expectations of what will exist in the future [47].

Sociologically, radicalism is not an exclusive movement. Because the ideology that its critics call radical wants to be known or famous and wants to get support from many people. Even though being known or being famous is not the goal but is the result of their interaction with the community. Some of the characteristics of radicalism, as stated by Reny, are as follows [48], [49]:

1. Radicalism is a response to current conditions. The response is manifested in the form of evaluation, rejection, and even hard resistance. According to the author, these characteristics are not synonymous with radicalism. Because these forms of response are actions that are considered legitimate in a democracy. Even this form of rejection, which is usually in the form of criticism on social media or demonstrations, is also often carried out by the opposition in the practice of democratic politics, both by political parties, mass organizations, and organized mass groups.
2. Make continuous efforts to resist and demand the drastic changes you want to happen. Theoretically, big and drastic changes don't always mean negative. However,



according to Aksin, radicalism tends to have a negative connotation due to the use of extreme methods, violence, and destruction. If this is the standard, then actually radicalism is mostly practised by non-religious movements. For example, coups against legitimate power in various Muslim countries, and demonstrations to overthrow power were mostly not motivated by religious fervour.

3. Radicals are also characterized by reproducing fake news or hoaxes because they are considered to be by their thoughts and desires. This characteristic is also considered strange when pinned on groups that are considered radical. Hoaxes have become a social phenomenon recently. Anyone has the potential to produce and spread hoaxes as a consequence of the development of social media as a new means for people to interact. Even though some observers think that the best hoax maker is the ruler. But radicals are rarely associated with power.

### **Radicalism Narrative Object**

Anyone who looks at the issue of radicalism clearly can easily conclude that the narrative of radicalism has two objectives, namely: first, an attempt to cover up the failure of the authorities in reducing poverty, corruption, and various other socio-political problems. At the same time pressing those who are critical of power. In a discussion entitled 'Indonesia Belongs to Us or Whose?', member of the DPR, Fadli Zon said that the issue of radicalism became a scapegoat to cover up his failure to manage the country. Indonesia is experiencing a condition that has made the peace it aspires to more difficult because there are efforts to create a stigma among existing groups. Religious groups want to be opposed to Pancasila. Another DPR member, Hanafi Rais, also expressed the same thing. According to him, the issue of radicalism is suspected as an attempt to cover up declining or stagnant economic growth. The issue of radicalism can divide *ukhuwah* and brotherhood. Therefore, LIPI observer, Siti Zuhra, believes that the nation's problem is not radicalism but very serious socio-economic inequality [50].

Second, the target issue of radicalism is Islam and Muslims as a form of effort to marginalize political Islam. Because Islamic political aspirations, which are rivals of secular democratic politics, continue to move to make people aware of the urgency of Islamic politics. According to Ubaedillah, the tendency to use Islam as a political symbol among Muslim activists at the beginning of the New Order era became a cause for suspicion from the authorities which resulted in the exclusion of Islam from the national political arena. Even in the current era, this suspicion continues to be fostered and guarded [51].

This is addressed by the policy of making mosques the target of anti-Islam policies. They plan to map mosques on the grounds of preventing radicalism. The head of the BNPT admitted that he had received information about several mosques in DKI Jakarta that were suspected of being exposed to radicalism for a long time. The agency even asked the Ministry of Religion to oversee the mosques [52].

Previously, the authorities also spoke diligently about the importance of religious moderation, which is certainly not far from the intention to fight radicalism. All narratives of radicalism pinned on Muslims are clearly politically charged, most likely for two purposes: first, to kill political Islamic thought. Secondly, covering up the country's big problems which are precisely caused by the abuse of authority by the authorities. Because of this, in the national symposium on the three pillars of *da'wah* at the Indonesian Islamic University it was concluded that the issue of radicalism that has been blowing in Indonesia so far has more political content than issues of substance. When viewed from the debates carried out by many parties, the definition of radicalism is not clear [53].

Some Western researchers tend to accuse the roots of radicalism in Islam as originating from the sources of Islamic teachings themselves, namely the texts of the Qur'an and hadith. For this reason, they twist many verses of the Koran and hadith to justify their

opinion so that it is accepted by the academic community. However, often the term terrorism which has a Western image of Islam raises the notion that radicalism seems to always be synonymous with Islam, which in the end radical movements outside of Islam are not widely known by the public. Therefore, it is important for Muslims that what they are fighting for is true but it will be counterproductive if carried out with terror. Sometimes, the small mistakes of Muslims become a problem when they are caught and propagated by Islamophobic groups. Even though theoretically accusations of radicalism and terrorism are not only directed at Muslims, this bad stigma is a big and planned project to lead world opinion to oppress Muslims [54].

Apart from that, in terms of terminology and these limitations, it appears that the term radicalism is deliberately biased so that it can be interpreted by the 'mandate of power'. Its generic and sociological meaning. Thus, it can easily be used as a tool to beat anyone critical of power [55].

Under the pretext of preventing radicalism, various parties then campaigned for religious moderation, namely moderate religious understanding. Moderates are often opposed to radicals. These two terms are not scientific terms but tend to be political terms. Nevertheless, according to Taufiq, even though the term "moderate Islam" does not have a precise definition in Islam, it seems actualized to create a polite Islam and understand other groups without destroying the core values of Islam. The two terms, radical and moderate, are classifications of Muslims that lead to the political goal of splitting bamboo, apart from diverting the issue as explained earlier [56].

These two terms have specific political aims and objectives. The reason is, that being moderate is a religious understanding (Islam) that suits Western tastes; by Western secular values (separating religion from life). On the other hand, radical is a religious (Islamic) ideology that is attached to Islamic groups that are anti-Western values and politics and require the application of Islamic sharia comprehensively in all aspects of life. It is this group of Muslims who have a strong stance in rejecting secularism. An ideology that was actually declared heretical by the MUI but still maintained by the authorities [57].

A study conducted by Margareta, Nina Terlan, and Erik Meinema, saw that there was a kind of conditioning of public perceptions of radicals and moderates. According to an analysis by a political scientist from Uganda, Mahmood Mamdani, post-9/11 Islamic discourse was split into two poles, namely 'Good Muslims', namely those who are willing to accept differences and in other words conform to the interests of America's security foreign policy. The opponents of good Muslims are bad Muslims, namely those who are grouped with radicals, anti-Western, anti-US, and their allies and want to restore Islam in the current world political order [58].

Thus, since the bombing of the WTC Building on September 11, 2001, the US has used the issue of terrorism as part of its global scenario to weaken Islam and Muslims. To that end, the researchers then suggested several choices of steps for AS. One of them is promoting the network of "moderate Islam" to counter the ideas of "radical Islam". As revealed Thierry Meyssan, a French journalist in his analysis concluded that the WTC 9/11 attacks were not carried out by Muslims but by insiders in America themselves. These kinds of patterns seem to be used by the parties in power to play up the issue of terrorism [59], [60].

Because of this massive campaign and stigmatization, western news agencies, as well as many mass media in Muslim countries, are now used to using the terms 'fundamentalist Islam', and 'moderate Islam'. Moderate Islam is considered an attempt to adopt modern (western) and up-to-date values. Even though the terms 'modernism, moderate and fundamentalism were raised by Western academics in the context of religious history in their society, namely Christianity.

Moreover, in the 2006 RAND Corporation document entitled, "Building Moderate Muslim Networks" it is stated that the highest US victory can only be achieved when Islamic ideology continues to be badly imaged in the eyes of the majority of the population where they live. One of them is by labelling "radical", and "fundamentalist"., "extremists", etc. In his book, Thierry Meyssan states that the RAND Corporation is the most important privately owned strategic research centre and military organization in the world with an annual budget of \$ 160 million [61], [62].

Former US President George W Bush once called Islamic ideology "the ideology of extremists". However, George Soros said that the Bush administration was an extremist government. According to him, the US invasion of Iraq is evidence of the presence of extremists in the Bush administration [63].

Even so, Bush's statement was supported by his colleague, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who called Islamic ideology "the ideology of Satan". He stated this in his speech at the British Labor Party National Policy Conference (2005). Blair then explained the characteristics of "satanic ideology", namely: (1) Rejecting Israel's legitimacy; (2) Having the thought that sharia is the basis of Islamic law; (3) Muslims must become one unit under the auspices of the Khilafah; (4) Not adopting liberal values from the West [64], [65].

Western thinkers call radicalism by various terms. Esposito calls it the term Islamic revivalism or Islamic revivalism. Adam Schwarz calls it militant Islam. Karen Armstrong calls it fundamentalist Islam. Meanwhile, Azyumardi Azra called it radicalism. As a result, the issue of radicalism is a global issue. This issue is a continuation of the issue of terrorism which has failed to achieve the goals of Western countries. According to Zakiyudin Baidhaw, the theme of Islam and terrorism cannot be separated from the stereotypes and biases deliberately constructed by Western academics and religious leaders regarding Islam or Islamophobia. Pope Benedict XVI made a controversial speech on September 12, 2006, at the University of Regensburg. He views Middle Eastern Islam as a force of extreme violence as opposed to the West which embraces peace as a result of the Enlightenment era [66]–[69].

Evidence that terrorism and radicalism are Western fabrications was uncovered after the emergence of various acts of terrorism and radicalism that have appeared in the US and Europe recently where the perpetrators are extreme right groups who have hatred of Islam. So far, the West has turned a blind eye to the real perpetrators, who are none other than their community. This narrative of the war against terrorism, radicalism, and extremism with the target of fighting Islam and Muslims is also continuously campaigned by Muslim rulers, including in this country. They continuously campaign hatred against Islam (islamophobia) and Muslims [70].

## CONCLUSION

The issue of radicalism is an addition to the term terrorism that already existed before. Globally, the discourse of radicalism is not an original domestic product. This means that the discourse on radicalism and moderatism is a transnational idea adopted from Western values and Western political policies towards Muslims. Likewise, rulers in Muslim countries only copy-paste while innovating in implementing radicalism discourse in a national political policy. Viewed from the theoretical aspect, the discourse of radicalism and moderatism is a strategy and corporation to seize the unity of Muslims. Therefore, campaigning for these two discourses, whether we realize it or not, has contributed to dividing Muslims with narratives of hatred created by the West. Based on this study it can also be concluded that the discourse of radicalism has two interests: First, demanding the enthusiasm of Muslims to practice their religious teachings. Their freedom is restrained by cornering narratives. The main goal is to demand the discourse and tendency of Muslims to practice Islam within the framework of state politics. Second, radicalism is a



scapegoat that is used to cover up the failure of the authorities to fulfil people's rights, especially in the fields of economy/welfare, education, and legal justice.

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### Author Contribution

The author contributed equally to the main contributor to this paper, some are as chairman, member, financier, article translator, and final editor. The author read and approved the final paper.

### Conflicts of Interest

All authors of this journal have no conflict of interest other than for the development of science itself.

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