
	Profetika: Jurnal Studi Islam P-ISSN: 14110881 E-ISSN: 25414534 Vol. 26, No. 3, 2025, pp. 821–836 https://doi.org/10.23917/profetika.v26i03.14362	
Received July 06, 2025	Revised November 27, 2025	Accepted December 30, 2025

Institutional Authority Reconstruction in Anti-Corruption Enforcement: An Islamic Legal Approach to SDG 16

Muhammad Fadly Hasibuan¹, Febrian², Iza Rumesten RS³, Saifudin Amin⁴

^{1,2,3}Faculty of Law, Sriwijaya University, Indonesia

⁴Muhammadiyah Islamic College (MIC), Singapore

¹jaksamfh@gmail.com, ²febrian_zen@yahoo.com, ³izarumesten@gmail.com,

⁴saifuddin@muhammadiyah.org.sg

Abstract

Objective: This study aims to analyze the authority of law enforcement agencies in handling corruption crimes in Indonesia and its relationship with efforts to realize the effectiveness of law enforcement that supports the achievement of SDG 16 on justice and transparent governance. **Theoretical framework:** The theoretical framework of this research is based on the concept of the authority of law enforcement agencies in the eradication of corruption by examining the applicable legal basis and the idea of reconstructing the ideal law enforcement system, including the perspective of national criminal law and Islamic criminal law. **Literature review:** A literature review discusses the regulations governing the authority of investigation, investigation, and prosecution by law enforcement agencies in corruption cases, as well as the ideal concept of law enforcement in the eradication of corruption. **Methods:** This study uses a normative juridical method through a literature study of laws and regulations and legal references to analyze the insynchronization of authority between law enforcement agencies. **Results:** The results of the study show that there is an overlap of authority between law enforcement agencies that causes institutional conflicts, delays in handling cases, as well as potential political intervention and legal uncertainty, especially after the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019 related to the CEC. **Implications:** This study emphasizes the importance of reconstructing authority through the revision of corruption eradication regulations and strengthening coordination and division of authority between law enforcement agencies so that the handling of corruption cases is more effective and synergistic. **Novelty:** The novelty of this research lies in the analysis of the imbalance of the authority of law enforcement agencies and the proposal of a model for the reconstruction of the authority of corruption law enforcement that supports the achievement of SDG 16.

Keywords: corruption, law enforcement, reconstruction of authority, islamic law, sdgs.

INTRODUCTION

The construction of Indonesian criminal law recognizes the term Corruption as a form of extraordinary crime (*Extraordinary Crime*), which is developing very rapidly, especially in Indonesia, which is included as a category of developing countries. The Crime of Corruption, according to Law No. 20 of 2001 on the amendment of Law No. 31

of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption Crimes, in article 3, is a crime that is detrimental to the state's finances and the state economy. On the other hand, corrupt practices are a central issue in developing countries such as Indonesia that burden the atmosphere of people's lives ethically, morally, socially, economically, and politically [1]. The state has the responsibility of carrying out effective and efficient eradication efforts to reduce the number of corruption crimes in Indonesia by involving several law enforcement officials and strengthening the formulation of laws and regulations that are the legal basis for the eradication of corruption.

The crime of corruption directly or indirectly harms the state's finances or the state economy, which at the same time harms the people. Thus, efforts to eradicate corruption are unrealistic if they do not involve the community as stakeholders. In Article 41 of Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the eradication of corruption, it is determined that the role of the community is determined, and the same is the case in the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Article 13, which guarantees public involvement [2].

In principle, corruption crimes are included in the special criminal category, which means that corruption cases have certain specifications compared to general crimes. The emphasis on corruption crimes is about how irregularities involve the country's finances and economy, so that the impact of this corrupt practice will affect the improvement of development and the welfare of the general public [3]. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement in the event of corruption cases, the role of those who have the authority over the implementation of criminal law enforcement is highly risky in the eyes of the public.

Criminal law enforcement, especially in the context of corruption, has three main factors that play a role, namely, aspects of laws and regulations, law enforcement officials, and public legal awareness. These three factors are representations of the components of the legal system to meet the elements of substance, structure, and legal culture. Nevertheless, the complexity in terms of eradicating corruption emphasizes that the relationship between one and the other is very influential on the law enforcement process, which is basically oriented to create order and justice in society [4].

The factor that becomes an obstacle in efforts to eradicate corruption is the inadequate facilities and capabilities of law enforcement officials. The corruption crimes that occurred were only known to the authorities after a long time, so the perpetrators had moved, used, and spent the proceeds of the corruption crime, which resulted in relatively small efforts to recover state finances. Some large cases whose handling was not careful have hurt the prosecution process [5].

The effectiveness of law enforcement for corruption crimes must adhere to the principle of professionalism and independence of each institution authorized to eradicate corruption crimes. According to Gustav Radbruch's concept of legal objectives, the law must aim to meet the value of legal certainty, legal justice, and legal usefulness, and according to Hadjon, weaknesses in the criminal justice system in Indonesia are often opportunities to be used by corrupt perpetrators to avoid appropriate punishment [6]. The weakness of law enforcement institutions has a vulnerability to participation in providing political intervention and weak coordination of authorized state institutions in carrying out their duties, so that individual professionalism and institutional integrity have an important role as a form of law enforcement efforts for corruption.

The Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC), the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Indonesian National Police are the three law enforcement instruments that have the authority and are justified by law to carry out their duties in handling corruption cases. The state institution has a function in conducting investigations, prosecutions, and corruption cases, but all three have

their own functions and roles. The authority of each state institution clearly opens up the potential for overlapping authority because the CEC should have full authority in handling corruption cases [7]. However, on the other hand, the Police and the Prosecutor's Office also participate in handling corruption cases based on the Criminal Code, which means that the two institutions have the authority to handle all criminal acts, including corruption, and this opens up opportunities for inequality of authority to handle corruption cases if it is not supported by good coordination and integrity towards each state institution.

Each state institution, both the CEC, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Police, has legal legitimacy from laws and regulations and their derivatives to crack down on corruption cases. The success of law enforcement in handling corruption cases in Indonesia is not only determined by the substance of regulations as the basis of material law, but the success of law enforcement also involves implementation, independence of law enforcement agencies, and community participation as a supervisory function. Therefore, the effectiveness of law enforcement must be seen as an ecosystem that involves various instruments, including regulations, institutions, and public awareness, that must be integrated with each other [7].

Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia gives full authority to investigate all criminal acts, while Law No. 31 of 1999 jo. Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption states that investigations can be carried out by the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the CEC. However, looking at the reality, the authorized institutions are different institutions in structure and responsibility to their respective superiors. Except for the need for over-the-counter (OTT) operations, the three institutions can carry out investigations independently based on the limits of the authority of each institution [7].

The legality of each institution in handling the same type of case often triggers various conflicts and inequities during the litigation process, including competition between state institutions. The implication will be that there will be disharmony between law enforcement agencies, which, by origin, the three institutions have the same goal to eradicate corruption. This will have an impact on the process of prosecuting corruption cases, while there is still a disparity in authority between the institutions if it is not adjusted to the competence of each authorized institution.

Seeing this situation, it is necessary to refine or reconstruct the authority of law enforcement officials in handling corruption cases. This hope is an answer to the imbalance of authority and minimizes the occurrence of conflicts *of interest* of each state institution, so that later in handling corruption cases, each institution has clear limits of authority. Therefore, responding to this legal phenomenon, it is necessary to conduct an evaluation study of existing regulations and their implementation in the field to ensure legal certainty for the authorized parties to carry out efforts to eradicate corruption. So, this study will discuss how to regulate the authority of the CEC, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Police, as well as the forms of conflict of authority that arise in the practice of handling corruption crimes, and then examine the ideal model of authority reconstruction to realize a more effective and integrated handling of corruption crimes [8].

This study offers novelty by integrating three analytical dimensions that are rarely examined simultaneously in corruption law enforcement discourse. First, it reconstructs the institutional authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC), the Prosecutor's Office, and the Indonesian National Police through a harmonization model based on the principle of *lex specialis derogat legi generalis*, positioning the CEC as the central coordinating authority. Second, it combines the theory of legal system effectiveness with Islamic legal principles, particularly

masalah, accountability, and moral-spiritual integrity, as a complementary framework to strengthen formal legal mechanisms. Third, this research explicitly incorporates the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), as an evaluative and normative framework in assessing institutional performance and legal reform [8].

The implications of this study are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it contributes to the development of a multidisciplinary legal approach by linking positive law, Islamic legal values, and global governance frameworks. Practically, it provides policy recommendations to strengthen coordination, clarify institutional authority, and establish integrated enforcement mechanisms. These reforms are expected to enhance transparency, accountability, and institutional effectiveness, thereby supporting Indonesia's commitment to achieving SDG 16 targets in building strong, just, and corruption-free institutions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Several studies on law enforcement authority in enforcing corruption crimes have contributed to supporting the big agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is shown by looking at the authority of each institution that has the authority to crack down on corruption cases in Indonesia involving several Law Enforcement Institutions. Therefore, law enforcement must have integrity to suppress corruption crimes, as evidenced by the collaboration of law enforcement agencies without any imbalance of authority in each law enforcement agency.

The first study is about the intersection of the authority of the National Police and the CEC in handling corruption crimes as a form of representation to achieve SDG 16, which emphasizes justice and inclusive institutions without juridical inequality of authority. The analysis carried out refers to positive law in the form of laws and regulations that regulate the authority of law enforcement agencies, which, in the results of the study, show that there is an overlap of authority that opens up opportunities for conflicts of interest to arise in its enforcement [9].

The second study, on the analysis of the effectiveness of law enforcement against corruption in Indonesia, critically examines the effectiveness of law enforcement institutions that already have a strong and special legal basis but have been weakened due to political intervention and the results of the study show that there is a need to strengthen institutions that are specifically regulated in the law to crack down on corruption cases as a form of openness and transparency in legal aspects to achieve SDG 16 [10].

The third study is about the role and authority of the attorney general in law enforcement in corruption cases, which examines the legal interpretation of the prosecutor's authority in handling corruption cases with the authority to conduct investigations and investigations. On the other hand, this authority is also owned by several other law enforcement institutions [11].

METHODOLOGY

This research employs a normative juridical approach to examine the reconstruction of institutional authority in anti-corruption enforcement from an Islamic legal perspective toward achieving SDG 16. This approach focuses on analyzing legal norms, principles, and doctrines embedded in statutory regulations, aiming to systematically interpret and evaluate the coherence between legal frameworks and their practical implementation. By using this method, the study formulates legal phenomena concretely through a comprehensive review of laws and regulations, serving as an analytical tool to assess the synchronization between normative provisions and enforcement practices in the field.

The type of research conducted is doctrinal legal research, which emphasizes the exploration and development of legal concepts, principles, and doctrines based on established legal theories. This approach allows the researcher to construct arguments grounded in authoritative legal sources and to critically evaluate the effectiveness of institutional arrangements in combating corruption. The doctrinal nature of this research also facilitates the integration of Islamic legal principles, particularly those related to justice, accountability, and public welfare (maslahah), into contemporary anti-corruption frameworks [12].

The data utilized in this study consists of secondary data, which is categorized into three types. First, primary legal materials include binding laws and regulations relevant to anti-corruption enforcement, such as statutory provisions governing institutional authority. Second, secondary legal materials comprise scholarly literature, including books, peer-reviewed journals, and prior research studies that provide theoretical and analytical insights into legal and institutional issues. Third, tertiary legal materials include legal dictionaries and encyclopedias that support the clarification of legal terminology and concepts. Data collection is conducted through an extensive literature study, involving the systematic identification, compilation, and review of relevant legal documents and academic sources. This method ensures that the research is grounded in credible and authoritative references, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the legal and institutional landscape.

Table 1. Methodology

Aspect	Description
Research Approach	Normative juridical approach analyzing legal norms and synchronization between law and practice
Type of Research	Doctrinal legal research based on legal theories and principles
Data Type	Secondary data
Primary Materials	Laws and regulations related to anti-corruption and institutional authority
Secondary Materials	Books, scientific journals, and relevant legal literature
Tertiary Materials	Legal dictionaries and encyclopedias
Data Collection	Literature study through systematic review of legal documents and academic sources
Data Analysis	Qualitative analysis based on post-positivism (Sugiyono)
SDGs Framework	SDG 16: peace, justice, strong institutions, transparency, accountability

The data analysis method adopts qualitative analysis, which is rooted in the post-positivist paradigm as articulated by Sugiyono. This approach emphasizes interpretative analysis, enabling the researcher to critically examine legal texts, identify patterns, and draw meaningful conclusions regarding institutional authority and its effectiveness in anti-corruption enforcement. The qualitative method is particularly suitable for capturing the complexity of legal norms and their application in practice. In addition, this study incorporates an SDGs-based analytical framework, specifically aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). This framework is used to evaluate how institutional authority reconstruction contributes to strengthening transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Indicators such as institutional effectiveness, legal certainty, and anti-corruption performance are employed to assess alignment with SDG 16 targets. By integrating this perspective, the research not only provides a legal analysis but also situates its findings within a global development agenda, enhancing its relevance and policy implications [13].

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Regulation of the Authority of the CEC

The establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC) as a state institution authorized to eradicate corruption crimes is regulated in the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia Number VIII/MPR/2001 concerning Recommendations for Policy Directions for the Eradication and Prevention of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. Article 2 number 6 letter a namely: The direction of the policy of eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism is to form laws and implementing regulations to help accelerate and effectively implement the eradication and prevention of corruption, the contents of which include the Corruption Eradication Commission, Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning amendments to Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption, and Law No. 19 of 2019 concerning the second amendment to Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC).

The Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC) is an independent institution that has a special task to deal with corruption problems in Indonesia. Hierarchically, the position of the CEC is a balance between the existence of the executive, legislative, and judiciary so that its authority is not disturbed by political intervention or power. Some of the authorities and positions of the CEC, based on Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, are interchangeable [13]:

- a. Carry out preventive measures, such as studies of the government system, internal supervision of state institutions, and community counseling (Article 6, letter a).
- b. Make a report on the prevention of corruption crimes.
- c. Coordinating the eradication of corruption with other institutions, such as the police and the prosecutor's office (Article 6, letter b)
- d. Supervise the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes committed by the police or the prosecutor's office (Article 6 letter c).
- e. The CEC has special authority to conduct investigations, investigations, and prosecutions of corruption crimes (Article 6 letter d). This authority is carried out without having to go through the permission of other institutions, including the court.
- f. The CEC has the authority to intercept communications without the need for permission from other institutions, with the aim of obtaining evidence to handle corruption cases (Article 12, paragraph 1).
- g. The CEC can conduct searches and seizures with direct authority, without requiring the approval of external institutions (Article 12, paragraph 2).

The authority of the CEC to conduct investigations and investigations has been regulated in Article 6, letter C as described above. Another legal basis that mentions the authority of investigation is regulated in Law No. 8 of 1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure Law, which directly applies to investigators at the CEC institution. As the authority possessed by the Investigator is mentioned in Article 7 paragraph (1) letters a to j as referred to in Article 6 paragraph (1) letter a, because of his obligation, the investigator has the authority, among others, to receive reports or complaints from a person about the existence of a criminal act; Perform the first action at the scene; Ordering a suspect to stop and checking the suspect's identity card; To make arrests, detentions, searches, and seizures; Conducting checks and seizures of letters; Taking fingerprints and taking pictures of someone; Summoning people to be heard and examined as suspects or witnesses; Bring in the necessary experts in relation to the

examination of the case; Hold a termination of the investigation; Taking other responsible legal action [14].

The entire process of eradicating corruption, both at the level of investigation and prosecution, is a role the Corruption Eradication Commission has in it. According to the provisions of the procedure at the Corruption Crimes Court (Article 51 of Law No. 30 of 2002), Public Prosecutors appointed and dismissed by the CEC have the right to prosecute corruption cases. However, Law No. 30 of 2002 does not regulate the length of time required regarding the collection of evidence until sufficient evidence is obtained so that it can be called a criminal event or the closure of a case that must be canceled for the sake of the law, or often referred to as SP3 (Investigation Termination Warrant) by CEC Investigators. This gives hope for the CEC to meet the sufficiency of preliminary evidence for an incident of corruption [15].

In the context of Investigation and Investigation, the Indonesian National Police has various authorities stipulated in several laws to carry out their duties, including in handling corruption crimes. The duties and responsibilities of the Police as investigators are clearly regulated in Law No. 8 of 2018 concerning the Criminal Procedure Law in conjunction with Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia [16]. In accordance with Article 15 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law No. 2 of 2002, it is explained that the police are authorized to receive reports, search evidence and information, carry out arrests and detentions, conduct searches and seizures, and examine letters.

The legal consequences of the police's authority in investigations will certainly have a direct impact on the process of handling corruption crimes. Law enforcement in the field shows that there is police authority in terms of investigations by being juridically strengthened in Law No. 30 of 2002, Article 6 letter a, which states that the Police in eradicating corruption must coordinate with the CEC. The appointment of a police investigator who will handle the case will be determined directly by the CEC and given the status of a CEC investigator, but the police do not have the authority to prosecute because it can be done by the CEC and the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia has an expansion of authority that provides the opportunity to carry out its own institutionalization to conduct investigations into certain criminal acts as stipulated in Article 30 paragraph (1) letter d of Law No. 16 of 2004 and strengthened in Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption. However, in the process of handling corruption cases, there are 3 institutions that are legally recognized to conduct investigations in corruption cases, namely the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission.

The authority of the prosecutor's office in the investigation of corruption cases is also regulated in the Attorney General Regulation No. PER-039/A/JA/10/2010 as amended by Attorney General No. PER-017/A/JA/07/2014. The investigation of the corruption case by the prosecutor's office is sourced from:

- a. Reports;
- b. BPK/BPKP audit results;
- c. The results of the examination from the internal supervision unit.
- d. Transfer of cases from the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence/Intelligence Assistant/Head of the Intelligence Section;
- e. Deputy Attorney General for General Crimes/Assistant for General Crimes/Head of the General Crimes Section; and

f. Deputy Attorney General for Civil and State Administration/Civil and State Administration Assistant/Head of Civil and State Administration Section

An investigation is carried out when the results of the investigation are decided to be upgraded to the investigation stage and are based on the suggestions/opinions of the investigation technical officer at the level below him about the fulfillment of sufficient preliminary evidence. After the evidence is sufficient, prosecution can be carried out by the Prosecutor in corruption cases. So that the implications of the prosecutor's authority will have an impact on other law enforcement officials because there is the same authority to take action in the same case, namely, corruption cases.

In the judicial review, the Criminal Procedure Code has affirmed the Police as the main investigator, but the CEC and the Prosecutor's Office are also given authority, with certain limitations, to avoid the occurrence of *overlap* or overlapping authority with each other. The CEC has special authority *lex specialis* in order to deal with corruption based on aspects of financial and economic losses of the state as stipulated in articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 31 of 1999, jo Constitutional Court Decision No. 25/PUU-XIV/2016 [17]. The ideal model of reconstruction of the concept of investigation by maintaining the authority of each authorized institution because it already has legal legitimacy in each institution, but the handling mechanism must be under full coordination under the CEC to ensure efficiency and effectiveness during the implementation of the case. Therefore, the view on the effectiveness of case handling must emphasize good management competence so that the handling process is centralized and supervised by the CEC [18].

The implementation of law enforcement functions by the CEC, which includes investigations, prosecutions, and corruption perpetrators, is basically aimed at ensuring legal certainty. Therefore, the theory of legal certainty put forward by Sudikno Mertokusumo as *Middle Range Theory* is seen as in line with this, because this theory can describe the legal certainty that arises from the authority of the CEC in carrying out the task of investigating, prosecuting, and prosecuting corruption cases in Indonesia. Sudikno Mertokusumo stated that legal certainty is a guarantee that the law must be carried out in a good way by considering the efforts to regulate the law in the legislation made by the authorities, so that the rules function as a rule that must be obeyed [19].

Departing from the context of the authority of state institutions that have the same authority at the level of investigation, prosecution, and prosecution will open up opportunities for inequality of authority. If the context of the authority adopts the principle of *lex specialis derogat legi generalis*, then the Corruption Eradication Commission has special authority through the mandate of laws and regulations as an institution that is concentrated on handling corruption cases [20]. In the perspective of Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning amendments to Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption Crimes jo. Law No. 8 of 1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure Law, the Police have the authority to conduct investigations, and the prosecutor's office has the authority to prosecute and expand its authority in conducting investigations and investigations on the mandate of Perjagung No. PER-039/A/JA/10/2010 as amended with Corn Regulation No. PER-017/A/JA/07/2014 [21]. This shows the disintegration of the authority to take action between each institution even though it remains under the supervision of the CEC, if the Prosecutor's Office is an institution that holds the principle of *dominus litis* in this case, it is not considered important because there has been a special institution formed to crack down on special criminal cases (*Bijzonder Strafrechti*) regarding the handling of corruption [22].

Table 2. Comparative Legal Basis and Institutional Authorities in Anti-Corruption Enforcement in Indonesia

Legal Basis	CEC	The Attorney	Indonesian Police
-------------	-----	--------------	-------------------

General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia			
Authority to conduct Investigations	Article 6, letter d of Law No. 30 of 2002	Perjagung No. PER-017/A/JA/07/2014 jo Law No. 8 of 1981	Article 15 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law No. 2 of 2002, jo Law No. 8 of 1981
Authority to Conduct Investigations	Article 6, letter d of Law No. 30 of 2002	Article 30, paragraph (1), letter d of Law No. 16 of 2004	Article 15 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law No. 2 of 2002, jo Law No. 8 of 1981
Authority to Conduct Prosecution	Article 6, letter d of Law No. 30 of 2002	Article 30 paragraph (1) letter d of Law No. 16 of 2004 jo Perjagung No. PER-017/A/JA/07/2014 jo Law No. 8 of 1981	-

The authority to conduct investigations into corruption crimes lies with the police, the prosecutor's office, and the CEC, while the prosecution process itself can only be carried out by the Prosecutor's Office and the CEC [23]. Based on Article 10A paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law 19/2019, the CEC will take over the investigation and/or prosecution of perpetrators of CORRUPTION that are being carried out by the police or prosecutor's office on the grounds of:

- a. Public reports about corruption are not followed up on.
- b. The process of handling corruption without any settlement or delay, without any accountable reason.
- c. The handling of corruption is aimed at protecting the real perpetrators of corruption.
- d. Handling of typhoid contains elements of typhoid.
- e. Obstacles to handling corruption due to interference from executive, judicial, or legislative power holders; or
- f. Other circumstances that, according to the consideration of the police or the prosecutor's office, make the handling of corruption crimes difficult to carry out properly, and can be accounted for

The Ideal Authority Reconstruction Model to Realize a More Effective

The background of the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission stems from a history of law enforcement in Indonesia that is less effective in resolving corruption cases. The phenomenon of corruption is a model of extraordinary crime (*Extraordinary Crime*) which is carried out by violating the economic and social rights of the community and has little contact with human rights violations. Corrupt practices are a crime that has taken root and has become part of the character of some state apparatus [24]. Nevertheless, the Corruption Eradication Commission was established as an independent entity and as a form of representation, *State Auxiliary Organ*, to ensure that the eradication of corruption can run optimally because law enforcement agencies such as the Prosecutor's Office and the Police experience limitations in handling major cases.

The change in the position of the CEC began when there was a change in Law No. 19 of 2019 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, which had implications for the authority of the CEC in handling cases, which included [25]:

- a. The Corruption Eradication Commission is not an Independent Institution
- b. Establishment and great authority of the supervisory board (Article 37b of Law No. 19 of 2019)
- c. The executive has a full role in the appointment of the supervisory board
- d. The CEC cannot establish a representative office (Article 19 of Law No. 19 of 2019)
- e. The CEC must coordinate with the Police and the Prosecutor's Office in the context of investigation, prosecution, and investigation.

Based on these changes, the CEC is no longer an independent institution that can exercise freedom in eradicating corruption. The vulnerability to the length of time it takes to handle cases can be reviewed in terms of coordination, where the CEC has an obligation to coordinate with the Prosecutor's Office institution for prosecution purposes [26]. On the other hand, for investigation, we must synergize to appoint investigators in the Police and the Prosecutor's Office so that the process of handling corruption cases will be protracted and long because they must comply with the bureaucracy for handling criminal cases. The birth of Law No. 19 of 2019 concerning amendments to Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission has a very significant impact on law enforcement for corruption crimes [27]. These changes include:

1. SP3 Publishing Authority

SP3 is defined as a decree issued by investigators, both National Police investigators and Civil Servants (PNS), which is based on the Criminal Code used for the termination of criminal cases [28].

2. Research

In Law No. 19 of 2019, the CEC is given the authority to conduct investigations, including tapping and recording conversations as per Article 12, letter a of Law No. 30 of 2002. On the other hand, there is a shift in authority in the act of interception that must be obtained through the approval of the Board of Supervisors [29]. Therefore, these changes will have a direct impact on the mechanism for handling corruption.

3. Investigation Process

The implementation of an investigation should be appointed and terminated by the CEC, but in Law 19 of 2019, there is an expansion of who CEC investigators can come from, including the Police, Prosecutor's Office, Civil Servants who are given special authority by law, and CEC internal investigators [30]. The weakness of the investigation process is also strengthened by the length of actions that can be taken by investigators, as in Article 47 paragraphs (1) and (2), which basically are:

- a. Investigators need the approval of the Dewas in carrying out search and seizure measures in the investigation.
- b. The Dewas must issue a decision on a written permit within 24 hours after the application is received.

4. Prosecution

The submission of files from investigators to the public prosecutor has a grace period of 14 working days from the receipt of the file. The length of the judicial process also has an impact on the existence of Article 12 A of the CEC Law, which states:

"In carrying out the prosecution's duties, the prosecutor of the Corruption Eradication Commission must coordinate in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations". Departing from this article, it can be interpreted that the role of the CEC in prosecuting there is a separation of authority, which means that there must be coordination with other

law enforcement agencies [31]. This certainly indirectly means that the position of the CEC with other law enforcement agencies is assumed to be an equal institution, no longer hierarchical. Ideally, the CEC, without coordinating with other law enforcement agencies and through the transfer of files that have been received through the CEC, is sufficient to prosecute without coordination with other law enforcement agencies [32].

In order to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement, the improvement of the position and role of law enforcement agencies in accordance with their respective duties, functions, and authorities must be accelerated to improve their competence [33]. The return of the dignity of law enforcement officials in handling corruption cases will have a direct impact on the level of public trust in an institution, but the imbalance in the authority of each law enforcement agency is precisely a form of fighting for public trust in dealing with corruption. So that the integrity and professionalism of each law enforcement agency cannot be maintained due to the conflict of authority within the institution. Therefore, legal structuring or reconstruction needs to be carried out to create a new paradigm of law enforcement in eradicating corruption [34].

Lawrence M. Friedman, one of the leading thinkers in the field of legal sociology, affirmed that law functions as a system that lives in society. Therefore, the effectiveness of the law cannot be seen only from the content of written rules, but must be understood as the result of the interdependent relationship between the three main components of the legal system. The three components referred to in the Lawrence Friedman theory include:

1. Legal Structure;
2. Legal Substance;
3. Legal Culture.

The pattern of relationships between the structure of law, the substance of law, and the culture of law in Lawrence M. Friedman's theory is illustrated with the perspective that law can only work effectively if the three elements support each other and interact harmoniously. The legal structure plays the role of an apparatus and institution that implements and enforces rules that work professionally and are oriented towards law enforcement [35]. The substance of the law provides content, norms, and provisions that guide behavior. In substance, the law needs to be made clear, rigid, and provide rules that have a strong philosophical foundation, as well as the need to fix and eradicate the culture of corruption in Indonesia. Meanwhile, legal culture reflects the attitudes, values, and level of compliance of the community and the authorities with the law. The public should also not have a permissive nature or character towards corruption, as often happens today, as a form of public distrust of law enforcement officials [36].

Conceptually, the three elements, both structure, substance, and legal culture, do not stand alone. Because the substance of the law can only be applied if the legal structure can carry it out, and both will function optimally when supported by a conducive legal culture. On the other hand, if one of the elements is weakened, for example, unprofessional officials, unclear rules, or a permissive society toward violations, then the entire legal system becomes ineffective. Thus, Friedman emphasizes that the effectiveness of law is the result of the dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationships between the structure, substance, and culture of law in a social system [37]. Departing from this, the first thing that can be done to reconstruct the ideal model of law enforcement for corruption crimes is to revise the Corruption Law as a legal substance that can regulate the strengthening of the pattern of cooperation between law enforcement agencies, as well as strengthening and harmonizing criminal provisions in accordance with the current legal cultural conditions.

The need to revise the Corruption Law is increasingly urgent to strengthen the pattern of cooperation between law enforcement officials, especially the Corruption Eradication

Commission (CEC), the Prosecutor's Office, and the Indonesian National Police, because it is to ensure that there is a clearer, firmer, and non-overlapping coordination and supervision mechanism, so that the handling of corruption cases is not hampered by sectoral egos or differences in authority between institutions as has been the case so far. In addition, strengthening the rules regarding data exchange, *joint investigation obligations*, and integrated operational standards will allow each institution to work synergistically in the increasingly complex eradication of corruption [38].

A harmonious coordination pattern between the CEC, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Police can be a reconstruction of law enforcement between the three institutions. The authority to supervise can be given to the CEC with the assistance of the prosecutor's office, which is authorized to prosecute, and the police, who are given the authority to conduct investigations and investigations [39]. However, from the investigation process to the prosecution, each of these institutions needs to be based on integrated coordination and supervision obligations, which include:

- a. automatic exchange of investigative data;
- b. the establishment of a *joint task force* for specific cases;
- c. CEC supervision of the investigation or investigation process that has the potential to be stagnant or vulnerable to intervention;
- d. Clear coordination deadlines so that there is no criminalization, tug-of-war, or termination of cases without objective reasons.

Thus, the ideal design of authority places the CEC as the supervisor and main driver of corruption eradication, the Prosecutor's Office as the controller of prosecutions, and the Police as operational investigators, all working within a synergy, transparent, and sectoral ego-free legal framework [40]. The ideal pattern of authority also requires a case allocation mechanism, so that cases with small to medium values can be handled by the police or prosecutor's office, while large-scale cases with the risk of conflict of interest are handled by the CEC. Through the improvement of the Anti-Corruption Law, the relationship between legal substance, institutional structure, and law enforcement culture can be made more aligned, so that the eradication of corruption becomes more effective, coordinated, and oriented to the public interest.

Enforcement of Corruption in Islamic Criminal Law

From the perspective of Islamic criminal law, corruption falls under the category of *jarimah ta'zīr*, which is a criminal act that is not explicitly determined in the type and degree of punishment in *nash*, but whose substance is included in the prohibition of taking public property (*amwāl al-'āmmah*) illegally. Acts of corruption are in line with the elements of *ghulul* (betrayal of state property), *risywah* (bribery), and elements of *khiyānah* against the trust imposed by the state. Therefore, corruption is seen not only as an act against the law, but also as a moral crime and a betrayal of the principle of social justice as affirmed by the Qur'an in QS. Al-Baqarah:188, which prohibits the use of property in a null manner to undermine the system of law and justice [41].

In contrast to the positive legal sub-system that is bound by formal parameters of proof, the enforcement of corruption crimes in Islamic criminal law lays the moral accountability aspect of public officials as the basis for criminalization. The concept of *hisbah* gives the state and society the authority to supervise each other in the government apparatus so that there is no abuse of authority. In this context, *wilāyat al-mazālim* (the judicial authority to deal with the irregularities of state officials) serves to uphold administrative justice and restore public rights. This mechanism strengthens the principle of preventive anti-corruption, which not only waits for losses to occur, but also prevents actions since they are still in the form of opportunities [42].

The enforcement of corruption laws in Islam also emphasizes the aspect of structural prevention. Islam commands the governance of power with the principle of trust, *saddu dzar'ah* (closing the gap for crime), and transparency in the management of public property. Its modern implementation is reflected in the sharia audit mechanism, the obligation to report wealth (*al-istibrā' min al-māl*), and the restriction on the ownership of assets of public officials. This preventive enforcement does not stand alone, but becomes a systemic element as the effectiveness of corruption eradication also requires the synchronization of legal structure, substance, and culture. When compared to modern anti-corruption systems involving investigative and prosecution institutions such as the CEC, the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office, Islamic criminal law enforces corruption through a single enforcement model centered on the state judicial authority (*ulil amri*) with the support of *hisbah*. This mechanism is considered effective because it avoids conflicts of authority and institutional conflicts, such as those that occur in the law enforcement system in Indonesia. In line with this, some contemporary Islamic law scholars recommend an integrated anti-corruption system that places *hisbah* as an ethical-moral basis and *ta'zīr* as a model of repressive enforcement [43].

Thus, the enforcement of corruption in Islamic crimes emphasizes the unity of three aspects: moral-spiritual prevention, public and state supervision, and strict punishment with the principle of benefit. This model is very relevant to be implemented as a comparative perspective for the national positive legal system. The integration between sharia standards and national law can strengthen the eradication of corruption based on moral accountability, structural effectiveness, and recovery of state losses. In line with academic studies, this integrative approach provides a theoretical basis for formulating reforms of the anti-corruption system that are not only legalistic but also oriented towards public ethics and social justice.

CONCLUSION

First, the regulation of the authority of the CEC, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Police in handling corruption crimes shows that there is a division of functions that has been normatively stipulated in various laws and regulations, but still leaves room for overlapping authority. The Police and the Prosecutor's Office obtain a legal basis to conduct investigations based on the Criminal Code, the Police Law, and the Prosecutor's Law, while the CEC is granted special authority as *lex specialis* to carry out prevention, investigation, prosecution, and supervision independently, including case takeover mechanisms as stipulated in Law No. 19 of 2019. This overlapping authority potentially creates institutional inequality and weakens coordination. Applying the principle of *lex specialis derogat legi generalis*, the CEC should be positioned as the central authority in corruption enforcement. Meanwhile, the Police and the Prosecutor's Office retain their respective roles, although the expansion of prosecutorial authority through internal regulations reflects a fragmented enforcement structure. Second, referring to Lawrence M. Friedman's theory, the effectiveness of law depends on the interaction between legal structure, substance, and culture. Therefore, reconstructing an ideal anti-corruption enforcement model requires revising the Corruption Law to strengthen institutional synergy, clarify authority boundaries, and harmonize legal provisions with current socio-legal conditions. Strengthening coordination mechanisms, data-sharing systems, and integrated investigative procedures is essential to eliminate sectoral ego and overlapping mandates. Such reforms will enhance institutional coherence and improve the effectiveness of corruption eradication efforts. Third, from an Islamic legal perspective, corruption enforcement emphasizes the integration of moral-spiritual values, public supervision, and strict yet just punishment based on the principle of *maslahah* (public benefit). This holistic model complements the national legal system by embedding ethical accountability alongside formal legal mechanisms. Finally, integrating a Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approach, particularly Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong

Institutions), reinforces the urgency of institutional reconstruction. Strengthening transparency, accountability, and the rule of law through clear authority distribution and collaborative governance directly contributes to achieving SDG 16 targets. Thus, the harmonization of institutional authority, supported by Islamic legal values and SDGs principles, provides a comprehensive framework for effective, just, and sustainable anti-corruption enforcement in Indonesia.

Acknowledgments

The authors express sincere gratitude to academic supervisors and colleagues for insightful guidance, critical feedback, and continuous encouragement throughout this research. Appreciation is also extended to the language editor and institutional support staff for their valuable assistance. Their contributions significantly improved the clarity, quality, and completion of this study in accordance with academic standards and expectations.

Author Contribution

All authors contributed substantially to the conception, design, analysis, and writing of this paper. Each author participated actively in drafting, revising, and approving the final manuscript. The authors collectively take responsibility for the content and integrity of this work. All contributors have reviewed and agreed upon the final version submitted for publication in this journal.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper. This research was conducted independently, adhering to principles of academic integrity and ethical standards. All findings and interpretations are presented objectively. Responsibility for the content rests entirely with the authors, ensuring transparency, credibility, and scholarly accountability in this publication.

REFERENCES

- [1] Anak Agung Bagus Adhita Mahendra Putra, “Efektivitas Hukuman Pidana dalam Menanggulangi Tindak Pidana Korupsi,” *Terang J. Kaji. Ilmu Sos. Polit. dan Huk.*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 284–296, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.62383/terang.v2i2.1147>.
- [2] M. Yusuf DM *et al.*, “Persinggungan Kewenangan Polri Dan CEC Dalam Penanganan Tindak Pidana Korupsi: Analisis Yuridis,” *J. Ilm. Advokasi*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 752–762, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.36987/jiad.v13i2.6374>.
- [3] F. Andriansyah and A. W. Asmorojati, “Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam Dinamika Politik Hukum Ketatanegaraan Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019,” *Lex Renaiss.*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 249–273, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.20885/jlr.vol10.iss1.art10>.
- [4] A. K. Syafa’at, “Potensi Zakat, Infaq, Shodaqoh Pada Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) Di Kabupaten Banyuwangi Abdul,” *J. Chem. Inf. Model.*, vol. 53, no. 9, pp. 1689–1699, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.
- [5] A. Dadatashzadeh, A. B. Mehr, and M. Afshari, “Good governance and anti-corruption based on patterns of ombudsman management,” *Public Adm. Issues*, vol. 2019, no. 6, pp. 41–60, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.17323/1999-5431-2019-0-6-41-60>.
- [6] Muhammad AR, N. AR, Hayati, Nurbayani, Masrizal, and Sulaiman, “The Indonesian Journal of the Social Sciences Integrating Anti-Corruption Education in Acehese Dayahs: A Moral- Pedagogical Model for Character Formation,” *J. Ilm. Peuradeun*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v13i2.1086>
- [7] Irman Syahriar, Indera Dewi, Fifi Loanardy, Jamil Khairunnisah, and Bilal Hussain, “Judicial Neutrality in Corruption Trials: A Contemporary Islamic Law Perspective on Independence in Transitional Legal Systems,” *MILRev Metro Islam. Law Rev.*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1471–1488, 2025,

-
- <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v4i2.11425>.
- [8] R. Susmayanti and F. Hidayat, “Supreme and Constitutional Court’S Decisions on Permission of Former Corruption Convicts To Be Parliamentary Candidates: Whose Rights Should Be Protected?,” *Brawijaya Law J.*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 394–416, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2025.012.02.09>.
- [9] H. Sauni, Z. J. Fernando, D. A. Putra, S. Virdaus, and A. Hardianto, “Beyond Borders: Shedding Light on Foreign Bribery through an Islamic Legal Lens,” *Al-Istinbath J. Huk. Islam*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 649–678, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v9i2.9752>.
- [10] J. Hafidz, A. Noviyansyah, M. D. Saktiawan, A. P. Wiranto, and A. K. Osman, “Contemporary Legal Accountability Reform in Public Procurement: A Framework Integrating Ethical Norms and Anti-Corruption Mechanisms,” *MILRev Metro Islam. Law Rev.*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 517–538, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v4i1.10664>.
- [11] M. A. Rahman, “The Discursive Construction of Strategies for Implementing Anti-Corruption Education At State Islamic Higher Educational Institutions,” *J. Ilm. Peuradeun*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 555–578, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v10i3.737>.
- [12] H. Rajab, R. Pace, Thalhah, and R. Nurdin, “Ethical Governance in Public Service: A Comparative Study of Hadaya al-’Ummal in Islamic Law and Gratification in Indonesian Law,” *Int. J. Law Soc.*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 206–216, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.59683/ijls.v3i3.120>.
- [13] A. Akhmad, Z. J. Fernando, and P. Teeraphan, “Unmasking Illicit Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis of Wealth Acquisition Under Indonesian, Thai, and Islamic Law,” *J. Indones. Leg. Stud.*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 899–934, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.15294/jils.v8i2.69332>.
- [14] A. Karim, O. Fathurrohman, Muhammadun, W. Saripudin, D. Rahmat, and F. Mansir, “Altruistic works, religion, and corruption: Kiais’ leadership to shape anti-corruption values in pesantren,” *Cogent Soc. Sci.*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2238968>.
- [15] T. Riskawati, W. Salim, H. P. Hidayat Putro, and H. Ginting, “Faith-driven leaders in a non-theocratic country: internalizing Muhammadiyah values in local governance,” *Asia Pacific J. Public Adm.*, vol. 00, no. 00, pp. 1–24, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2025.2571898>.
- [16] Suparno, Rusli, and I. Hidayat, “A New Restorative Justice Paradigm in the Sociology of Islamic Law in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah’s Responses to Corruption Cases,” *Syariah J. Huk. dan Pemikir.*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 480–502, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.18592/sjhp.v24i2.16221>.
- [17] Yasid, “The Islamic perspective of changes in government administration and law: With special reference to the development of legal political system in post-reformasi Indonesia,” *J. Indones. Islam*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 76–92, 2012, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2012.6.1.76-92>.
- [18] Suyadi, Z. Nuryana, A. W. Asmorojati, and A. Yudhana, “Driving school program to strengthen anti-corruption education within the integrity zone policy,” *Int. J. Eval. Res. Educ.*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 2722–2731, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.11591/ijere.v14i4.28773>.
- [19] K. Baehaki, “Public Participation in the Law-Making Process in Indonesia,” *J. Media Huk.*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–13, 2025.
- [20] D. A. Yustia and F. Arifin, “Bureaucratic reform as an effort to prevent corruption in Indonesia,” *Cogent Soc. Sci.*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2166196>.
- [21] A. D. Nuryanto and A. K. Jaelani, “The Role of State Official Wealth Report in Realizing the Principles of Maqashid Sharia,” *Leg. J. Ilm. Huk.*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 155–181, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v32i1.32879>.
- [22] M. H. Tobing, N. N. Sirait, and M. Siregar, “Contiguity of Law Violations in the Context of Business Competition and Corruption in Bid Rigging Cases,” *J. Ecohumanism*, vol. 3, no. 8, pp. 476–483, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.62754/joe.v3i8.4748>.
- [23] M. R. Bima and R. Ramadani, “Position of Supervisory Board Organ and Its Implications for the Institutional Corruption Eradication Commission,” *Law Reform J. Pembaharuan Huk.*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 179–197, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i2.33770>.
- [24] T. D. Cahyani, M. H. Muhamad, and M. S. Hassan, “Comparative Analysis of The Effectiveness of Punishment Over Corruption in Indonesia and Hong Kong,” *J. Educ. Soc. Res.*, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 328–339, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.36941/jesr-2023-0140>.
- [25] D. Kadewardana, A. Paranata, and V. Endrődi-Kovács, “The aid-corruption paradox in development: An examination of provinces in Indonesia,” *J. Infrastructure, Policy Dev.*, vol. 8, no. 10, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i10.5356>.
- [26] S. Wahyudi, “Penal Policy on Assets Recovery on Corruption Cases in Indonesia,” *JILS (J. Indones.*
-

- Leg. Stud.*), vol. 4, no. 01, pp. 104–115, 2019, <https://journal.unnes.ac.id/sju/index.php/jils/article/view/29176/13314>
- [27] S. Sumartias, D. A. T. Pulubuhu, Sudarmono, A. N. Adi, and E. Ratnasari, “Democracy in the Indonesian Digital Public Sphere: Social Network Analysis of Twitter Users’ Responses to the Issue of Nationalism Knowledge Test at the Corruption Eradication Commission (TWK-CEC),” *J. Ilmu Sos. dan Ilmu Polit.*, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 240–257, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.70896>.
- [28] M. S. Ummah, “Legal Reform Against the Conflict of Norms in the Corruption,” *Sustain.*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1–14, 2019, <http://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/1091/RED2017-Eng-Gene.pdf?sequence=12&isAllowed=y%0Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2008.06.005%0Ahttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/305320484>
- [29] J. M. Monteiro, “Amendment of the Corruption Eradication Commission Act and Its Impact on the Constitution,” *J. Media Huk.*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 184–193, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.18196/jmh.v28i2.10941>.
- [30] A. Alfada, “Does Fiscal Decentralization Encourage Corruption in Local Governments? Evidence from Indonesia,” *J. Risk Financ. Manag.*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030118>.
- [31] M. Shoaib *et al.*, “Prevalence of Ixodidae Ticks and Their Association With Different Risk Factors in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan,” *J. Anim. Plant Sci.*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 413–420, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.36899/JAPS.2022.2.0438>.
- [32] T. Jamil *et al.*, “Revisiting brucellosis in small ruminants of western border areas in Pakistan,” *Pathogens*, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 1–10, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens9110929>.
- [33] M. Y. Idy and A. A. Sahabuddin, “Justice sector corruption: Will Indonesia neutralize it?” *Int. J. Criminol. Sociol.*, vol. 10, no. 0411, pp. 39–44, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.06>.
- [34] Z. Qathrunnada, C. Nugroho, F. Yusanto, A. Wulandari, and R. R. Wulan, “Ideology, resistance, and sociopolitical dynamics in Indonesia: media narratives and resistance discourses on the chairman of the corruption eradication commission’s corruption case,” *Front. Commun.*, vol. 10, no. February, pp. 1–11, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2025.1552110>.
- [35] A. Khoiri, W. Hidayat, D. Chalidyanto, and F. Suhariadi, “Disposition of policy implementers: Study on the hospitals payment system change in the Indonesian national health insurance era,” *Indian J. Forensic Med. Toxicol.*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 689–696, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.37506/ijfmt.v14i4.11568>.
- [36] R. Juwita, “A Human Rights-Based Approach to Combating Corruption in the Education Sector in Indonesia,” *Asia Pacific J. Hum. Rights Law*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 230–265, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-24020002>.
- [37] A. W. Qureshi, Z. Ullah Khan, L. Khan, A. Mansoor, and R. Minhas, “Prevalence of malaria, typhoid and co-infection in district Dir (lower), Pakistan,” *Biosci. J.*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 317–325, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.14393/BJ-v35n1a2019-42250>.
- [38] Ramiyanto, “Presidential permit to summon suspect of corruption of the member of the house of representatives,” *Sriwijaya. Law Rev.*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 203–214, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.28946/slrev.vol2.iss2.128.pp203-214>.
- [39] Sukmareni, E. Danil, Ismansyah, and Z. Daulay, “Implication of regulation authorities on the efforts to accelerate the eradication of corruption,” *Hasanuddin Law Rev.*, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 356–365, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.20956/halrev.v4i3.1078>.
- [40] B. D. Anggono and R. Wahanisa, “Corruption Prevention in Legislative Drafting in Indonesia,” *WSEAS Trans. Environ. Dev.*, vol. 18, pp. 172–181, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.37394/232015.2022.18.19>.
- [41] R. Achwan, “Reconceptualising political corruption in democratising societies,” *Asian Soc. Sci.*, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 201–209, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v10n11p201>.
- [42] S. A. Schütte, “Keeping the New Broom Clean: Lessons in Human Resource Management from the CEC,” *Bijdr. tot Taal-, Land- en Volkenkd.*, vol. 171, no. 4, pp. 423–454, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17104001>.
- [43] Abdullah *et al.*, “Dengue outbreaks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (CEC), Pakistan in 2017: An integrated disease surveillance and response system (IDSRS)-based report,” *Polish J. Microbiol.*, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 115–119, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.21307/pjm-2019-013>.