Judicial power as one of the branches of power in the theory of separation of powers implies that this power is entrusted with the authority to carry out the due process of law ((Asshiddiqie, 2015);(Barber & Fleming, 2007);(Ducat, 2009);(Chemerinsky, 2015)). According to its concept, judicial power is a sphere of power authorized to adjudicate conflicts between state institutions, between the state and individuals, and between individuals (Barnett’s, 2013). Judicial power is independent from legislative and executive interference. The independence of the courts is critical both concerning government according to law and protecting the human rights of citizens (Barnett’s, 2013), or carrying out judicial reviews of laws. The judicial A. Sakti R.S. Rakia et.al review authority is a logical consequence of the implementation of judicial power itself in the structure of modern constitutional law (Ducat, 2009). In Bora Laskin's description quoted by John Schmidhauser, the characteristics of court models encompass at least five models, namely the English Model, the Supreme Court of the United States Model, the "Purely Federal" Court, the Purely Constitutional Court, and France's Court of Cassation Model (Mary Hawkesworth, 2002).

In the rule of law of Timor Leste, the idea of establishing a Constitutional Court in 2002 is closely related to the spirit of upholding constitutional law and justice. Timor Leste's constitutional court functions to safeguard legal constitutional rights and should be aligned with other sections of state power (Luis & Fatima, 2020). As a democratic country, Timor Leste believes that the constitution will create a sense of shared identity. It can also play a nation-building role by defining political ties between people, and a peacebuilding role by encouraging reconciliation and building state institutions within society (Wallis, 2016).

The constitutional basis for the application of judicial power in the Indonesian constitutional system is included in Chapter IX of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. In Section (2) of Article 24, the Supreme Court (MA), its subsidiary courts, and the Constitutional Court (MK) exercise judicial power. The term "and a Constitutional Court" emerges in Article 24 Section (2), indicating that the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court are not subservient to one another, but equally subordinate to the Constitution. Although in Indonesia's constitutional history, there has been mention of the formation of a court whose function is to review regulations that collide with the constitution (Isra, 2020)(Putra, 2018), the post-reformation of the Constitutional Court was marked by the two Ad Hoc Committees I of the MPR RI Working Body (PAH I BP MPR) conducting comparative studies in 21 (twenty-one) countries, which are further discoursed and formulated in the Third Amendment (Sutiyoso, 2016).

In the post-reform Indonesian constitutional system, the founding of the Constitutional Court is strongly tangled with the concept of constitutional review or judicial review, which was influenced by the Marbury vs Madison case (Indonesia, 2015). Constitutional review is targeted to ensure that the Constitution is extensively implemented or enforced in the state administration process (Siregar, 2018). In modern democracies, it is customary to rely on courts with the power of constitutional review to ensure that elected officials do not violate their constitutional obligations (Krehbiel, 2016). The formation of the Constitutional Court was not only to tone down the constitutional function of the Supreme Court but could be seen as a consistent effort in structuring the Indonesian constitutional system, considering that at that time the MPR was authorized to carry out judicial reviews (Rakia, 2021).

The formation of the Constitutional Court was triggered by poor state administration, especially during the New Order era which was rife with cases of corruption, collusion, and nepotism, so the values of justice and the constitutional rights of citizens were transgressed (Darmadi, 2011). By attaching political matters to the Constitutional Court, it is deemed that, in fact, by its "nature," the Constitutional Court is perceived as a political institution (Perwira, 2016). If observed further, the Constitutional Court's decisions do have a socio-political impact on state dynamics (Faiz, 2016), but it is evident that the Constitutional Court's decisions are decided according to their function, namely testing the applicability of the law to the Constitution. At this point, the Constitutional Court seems to remind us that the state, as the highest organization in society based on political consensus, not only possesses the authority to regulate but is also obliged to guarantee the realization of justice through legal instruments under its control and enforce them through the courts.

One of the powers of the Constitutional Court as asserted in Article 24C Section (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, implies that the authority of the Constitutional Court is examining Laws against the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court's authority to carry out a legal review of the Constitution cannot be exercised for every type of legal enactment. Based on Article 50 of Act Number 24 of 2003, as amended by Law Number 7 of 2020 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment UUMK), elucidates that judicial review of the Constitution only applies to Laws promulgated after the Amendment Constitution.

Moreover, Article 56 Section (1) expresses that if the Constitutional Court believes that the applicant and its application do not satisfy the requirements as intended in Article 50 and Article 51, the decision states that the application is unacceptable. In other words, not every law can be examined because there are limitations in testing laws against the Constitution. The limitations appear inconsistent when the Constitutional Court reviews Act Number 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court in Constitutional Court Decision No. 004/PUU/2003 (Irawati, 2004), however, according to the Constitutional Court Article 50 of Act No. 24 of 2003 it eventually declares to have no binding force (Hastututi, 2016) (Sulistyowati, 2006).

Using simple legal logic, the MK's authority to review laws against the Constitution is very understandable because the process of law formation is an intersection process between law on one side, and politics on the other. It is believed that "the rule of law simply is the democratic rule of persons" (Hickey, 2019) so a constitutional balance of legal power is demanded. The Constitutional Court's capacity as "the guardian of the constitutions" or "the sole and the highest interpreter of the Constitution" has a significant role in constitutional law theory which safeguards the constitutional rights of citizens.

Sometimes misunderstanding occurs regarding the jargon “the only and most authoritative constitutional interpreter” which is translated as the MK is the sole/supreme institution to convert the constitution (Ali, 2016), especially the MK decisions which are erga omnes in nature. However, this opinion is not robust conceptually because there is no such clear and firm formulation in the Constitution. In practice, legislators transcribe the constitution, and this is legally valid as reflected in the legal products issued. Conceptually, the relationship between law and politics and between the legislature and the judiciary, even if it presents a special status to the courts, does not have the highest role in interpreting the Constitution (Harel & Shinar, 2012). Therefore, even though the Constitutional Court's decision is erga omnes, it is more accurate to describe that the Constitutional Court is "the final interpreter of the Constitution". Moreover, the title "the guardians of the constitutions" in practice is not only attached to the "Constitutional Court" but also to the "Supreme Court" (Bauman & Kahana, 2006).

Testing of a law is usually carried out in formal or material testing. Formal testing (formele toetsubfsrecht) perceives the validity of the procedure for forming the bill. Then, the right to test the material (materiele toetsingsrecht) is to observe the suitability of the material contained in the law to higher norms (Rishan, 2021). In formal testing evidence, the pattern of evidence used is to focus on proving the argument along with the applicant's evidence, then framing whether the argument is strong or otherwise (Widiastuti & Wibowo, 2022). Although it is said that the MK rarely or even does not grant formal tests ((Fathorrahman, 2021);(Marwan, 2022)), because it seldom considers the principles of forming statutory regulations (Sumodiningrat, 2021). In MK Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, the MK granted some requests for formal tests against Act Number 11 of 2020 on Job Creation.

In general, material review is to investigate and assess whether the contents of a statutory regulation correspond or conflict with regulations of a higher level, as well as whether a particular authority (verordenende macht) has the right to issue a particular regulation (Isra, 2016)(Soemantri, 1997). Nevertheless, this perception remains general because the right to material review (materiele toetsingsrecht) is innately owned by the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. Material testing is related to the possibility of material conflict between regulation and other higher regulations or concerns the particularities of regulation compared to commonly accepted norms (Nurhidayatuloh, 2016). Simply, the judicial review at the Constitutional Court occurs if a law is declared to be contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Sumadi, 2016).

Theoretically, in constitutional studies, it is comprehended that one of the legislative powers is the power or authority to form laws (Rakia, 2021). Dicey, as quoted by Alex Caroll, asserts that the concept of separation of powers is associated with 'continuing' sovereignty and that there should be no competency limits for the DPR's legislative authority (Caroll, 2007). What has been established by Parliament entails supreme force so it should not be able to be overturned or changed by any other domestic or external authority (Caroll, 2007). However, with the development of modern constitutionalism, such a truly strict separation of powers has been dominantly abandoned.

Based on Article 20 Section (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the power to form laws is vested in the DPR, although legislative authority is demonstrated in the executive and DPD. Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the President's legislative power was powerful. Post the amendment, although the authority to form laws was assigned to the DPR, the President's legislative authority was deemed to weaken the legislative function of the DPR (or DPD), resulting in an imbalance between executive and legislative powers (Daniele Susilo dan Mohammad Roesli, 2018). The President has legislative authority because such a position is obtained from the attribution of Article 20 Section (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Apart from the President's legislative authority, the other problematic polemic regarding the function of legislation is the DPD's legislative authority. Since Constitutional Court Decision Number: 92/PUU-X/2012 and Decision Number: 79/PUU-XII/2014, to date, the DPD's legislative function has not improved in practice or as expected by the public. From a theoretical perspective, the DPD should have equal authority as the DPR and the President in exercising their legislative functions, which is also reinforced by the Constitutional Court Decision. Strengthening the DPD's legislative function is always sought by amending the Constitution, or by applying the mechanism of the Constitutional Convention (Husen & Thamrin, 2017). On the one hand, the President as the executive branch of power owns legislative authority, while the DPD, which by nature is a legislative institution, possesses a weak spot. This imbalance of authority in the formation of laws between institutions ultimately brings about inconsistent and one-sided law formation.

To implement the separation of powers with a "check and balance system" mechanism, questions arise regarding how supervision can be performed over the legislative process. This can be achieved in at least 2 (two) ways, first, internalactive-preventive (internal supervision) by the President according to Article 20 Section 2 of the 1945 Constitution. Second, external-passive-repressive (external supervision), namely the legislative process which is supervised by the Court, in this case, the Constitutional Court, by Article 24C Section 1 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Kusuma, 2017). Although these two forms of supervision are intriguing, in practice the problem of forming laws originates from the failed implementation of internal supervision, or not "heeding" external supervision.

One of the main loci of concentration in the study of law is obedience to the law. The study of legal compliance begins with the questions of why people (individuals, governments, organizations) obey the law, how and why, what are the sanctions for compliance, and what are the obstacles to obeying the law, which in the end is all to measure the effectiveness of the law (A. (Ali & Ali, 2017). Furthermore, the reason for abiding by the law is due to internal factors such as deterrent effects or fear or external pressure in the form of strict sanctions (ibid).

Of the many types of obedience, one form is legal obedience. According to H.C. Kelman & Pospisil, legal compliance consists of identification, internalization, and compliance (ibid). Compliance is defined as, "an overt acceptance induced by expectation of rewards and an attempt to avoid possible punishment -not by any conviction in the desirability of the enforced rule. The power of the influencing agent is based on 'means-control' and, as a consequence, the influencing person's influence is only under surveillance (ibid)." In short, legal compliance is an acceptance (obedience) of something due to external punishment, but it requires continuous supervision (continuity).

In the same vein, H.L.A. Hart explains that discussions about legal compliance enlighten ideas or notions about the state of compliance. First, the state of obedience required of those who are addressed by the lawmakers, and second, obedience by those who hold sovereignty over the law (Hart, 2012). Obedience can be obtained because it is habitual (the habit of obeying) which may occur because of the relationship between citizens and rulers in the royal tradition, or obedience between the people and their Messenger. According to Hart, such compliance does not require literal explanation because its form is very simple, yet it carries the risk of discontinuity (ibid). Moreover, compliance is achieved due to coercive orders because it shows that a rule will not be effective if it is not accompanied by certain punishments (ibid).

In another quote, Hart affirms that there are 2 (two) ways to encourage compliance, namely:

a. Being 'required', being forced to act in a certain way because of threats, such as when a gunman orders someone to hand over money.

b. Being under an obligation is to feel within oneself that there is an imperative to act in a certain way, without an external stimulus forcing that action (Chinhengo, 2000).

Studies of legal compliance imply that the law can provide a framework for envisaging and predicting what others might do. Apart from coming from sanctions and legitimacy, legal compliance can also be obtained by displaying outstanding results though this is done once. In an experiment, the findings obtained were that compliance with the law contains an element of coordination and an element of negotiation (McAdams & Nadler, 2008). Another analysis that describes the relationship between the police and the community, reveals that the impact of legal compliance grows when there is a shared perception of fair procedures, regardless of whether it reflects a causal relationship or otherwise (Nagin & Telep, 2020).

Studies on compliance theory state that legal compliance is acquired from clear objectives and that theoretically compliance and non-compliance are not consistent every time. This is conducted to obtain compliance action that is limited in momentum. If related to the study of policy formation, the focus point is how public regulations influence the goal set and option set, namely so that a regulation that is formed will influence the formation of legal policy choices (ETIENNE, 2011). However, it can be guaranteed that the formation of a legal norm in a modern state should be attached to coercion so that the law is agreed upon, decided, and enforced to its destination. Compliance with the law lies in its essence as law both constitutively and regulatively, following the Roman law maxim itself, namely "lex minus dixit quam voluit and lex magis dixit quam voluit" (the law says what it wants) (Boella et al., 2009).

Even though this opinion is acknowledged, it is undeniable that the political atmosphere and activities in the formulation of these regulations are regulated by law. For instance, a law's enactment becomes valid if it is formed through processes regulated by law. The discourse regarding the relationship between law and politics is affected by the natural nature of law which is more limited, while politics appears to dominate (Rahardjo, 2014). In Indonesia, the relationship between law and political power is necessarily harmonious because the legal system adopted by Indonesia leads to positivism (Hajiji, 2013).

The 1945 NRI Constitution Amendment, with all of its prowess and drawbacks, establishes the Indonesian constitutional framework, which calls for sustainable growth and law enforcement that prioritizes the welfare of the populace, which is also written in the basic agreement of the Amendment of 1945 NRI Constitution (M.P.R., 2016). The Constitutional Court as a court that resolves problems with laws that do not correspond to the Constitution is an inseparable part of the Indonesian people's desire to strengthen the realization of a just and prosperous legal state which was previously subordinated to politically heavy.

The Constitutional Court's authority to review laws against the Constitution was inseparable from the spiritual atmosphere of the Indonesian people who at that time wanted a judiciary that functioned to maintain the consistency of laws against the Constitution (Indonesia, 2010). This serves as an affirmation of the principle of the rule of law and the need to protect human rights (constitutional rights) which are promised by the constitution, as well as a means of resolving several problems that happen in undetermined constitutional practice (ibid). Therefore, the Constitutional Court is seen as an institution with several functions, namely as the guardian of the constitution, the sole interpreter of the constitution, the guardian of democracy, as well as the protector of citizen's constitutional rights, and an institution that protects human rights (Rubaie, 2017). It is worth writing that the Constitutional Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution because the Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding or erga omnes.

According to Article 24C Section (1), one of the Constitutional Court's authorities whose rulings are final and binding/erga omnes is judicial review of the Constitution. This is distinct from the Constitutional Court's decision, which concerns the DPR's assessment of alleged infractions by the President and/or Vice President. The erga omnes principle is applied to the Constitutional Court's decision because it is final and binding. This is the reason behind the birth of the principle. Although in many cases this is not working (Nugroho, 2019), the Constitutional Court’s erga omnes decision aims to guarantee legal certainty. Therefore, it should be binding on all parties, both individuals and institutions ((Hakim & Rasji, 2018); (Heriyanto et al., 2021); (Isra, 2015)). Given that Constitutional Court Decisions in judicial reviews of laws are final and binding, every Constitutional Court Decision relating to the review of Laws against the Constitution is logically absolute and compelling. However, the Constitutional Court's decision's requirements for coercion are rather obscure, leaving a gap for negligence of enforcement, especially when the Constitutional Court declares that the open legal policy is the power of the DPR (Mantara Sukma, 2020).

In judicial studies, the existence and supremacy of the court lies in the accuracy and binding power of a decision which, of course, is one body with the role of a judge. This denotes that respecting a decision is influenced by the institutional and intellectual quality of a judge. A court decision regarding problems faced by society cannot be taken without measurable considerations (ratio decidendi) by the judges. Even though a court decision has binding legal force, it is entangled with judgments related to the Constitution, laws, precedents, conventions, scholarly doctrine, or social welfare considerations (Murphy, 2014). At this pivotal point, the Court, through the judges, should explain how and why the "hammer slap" was imposed, including if there is a dissenting opinion (ibid).

As one of the highest state institutions, the position of the Constitutional Court as a "biological child" of reform was formed as an attempt to harmonize the supremacy of the constitution with the politics of statutory regulations. In constitutional structure, positioning the Constitutional Court as a high state institution is a mere positioning of its decisions "in line" with the constitution, so, logically, there is no dual trial or judicial review of every Constitutional Court decision. The Constitutional Court's decision so the spirit and dignity of the constitution which concerns the fundamental rights of citizens, which is dissimilar from other court decisions that do not always impose legal consequences for all citizens. Meanwhile, A. Sakti R.S. Rakia et.al a variety of categories, such as ultra petita, conditional unconstitutional, and potentially normative verdicts.

An analysis carried out regarding public trust in the performance of the DPR RI for the 2014-2019 period concluded that the level of public trust in the DPR RI was at 47-52%. This presentation was considered concerning during the 10 (ten) years of reform, one of which was marked by the poor legislative products in the DPR (Rasaili, 2015). So far, there has been no firm regulation to encourage (even force) law-forming institutions to produce a minimum number of legislative products per year, so that the number of legal products produced through legislation is flexible.

It is expressly stated in Article 10 Section (1) letter d, Article 10 Section (2), and Article 23 Section (1) point b of the P3 Law, that the Content of the Law and the preparation of the National Legislation Program should consider the Constitutional Court’s Decision. The Elucidation of the P3 Law explains that “follow-up to the decision of the Constitutional Court” is related to the Constitutional Court’s decision on judicial review of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The law whi’h is expressly stated in the Constitutional Court's Decision is opposite to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The follow-up to the Constitutional court's decision is’aimed at preventing a legal vacuum from occurring.

Even though it has been regulated in such a way, as aforementioned, in practice the formation of laws does not always, or not all of them, accommodate MK decisions. Several factors affect why laws are not always or always fully incorporated into the formation of the law made by the Constitutional Court. First, the Constitutional Court’s decision is perceived as contentious because there are reasons to doubt it on both an internal and external level (Lumbuun, 2009). This factor has the potential to strengthen considering that in judicial reviews, law-making institutions tend to defend the laws they make. Second, there is a long legislative process and the need for legal addresses and a dynamic society (Wicaksono & Nugroho, 2021). Third, the rulings of the Constitutional Court can be classified under a variety of categories, such as ultra petita, conditional unconstitutional, and potentially normative verdicts.

Fourth, there is no designation of which institution should follow up on the Constitutional Court's decision. In preparing the national program, each institution authorized to form laws tends to compile a list of national programs based on certain interests or aspirations of its constituents. Considering that law-forming institutions are full of constituent political dimensions, the main consideration of parliament members is to prioritize certain interests or the interests of constituents. Thus, the absence of an appointment as to which institution is obliged to follow up on the Constitutional Court's decision has the potential for non-compliance. Fifth, there is no coercion or strict sanctions against law-forming institutions if they do not follow up on the Constitutional Court's decision. The existence of flexibility in following up on Constitutional Court Decisions provides a gap for law-forming institutions to feel that they are not being given constitutional responsibility. Frequently, legislators postpone a court decision to avoid debate, because they feel they have constitutional freedom in determining plans for forming regulations (Walen, 2009).

As mentioned previously, the Indonesian constitutional system adheres to legal development which does not only consist of the formation of statutory regulations but is also based on court decisions. This is an attempt to make the check and balance system’s implementation stronger to stifle the flow of connections between politics and the law, by providing a synergistic working node between high state institutions. Compliance with legal formation is a reflection of morality because the basic elements of good law enforcement originate from good morality. If Indonesia is a nation of good morality, then legislative morality for the sake of creating the national legal development that is aspired to can be realized.

This situation is an opportunity that can be used to encourage legislative performance that is aligned with the direction of national legal development and community development. In responsive legal theory, it is said that "responsive institutions" consider social pressures as a source of knowledge and an opportunity for self-correction (Nonet et al., 2017). Several principles can be used in the process of forming Legislative Regulations described by Lon Fuller which are called the principles of procedural morality in legislation (Chinhengo, 2000) (Fuller, 1964), namely:

a. There should be rules, that is, a rule based on the commands of the law that govern the subject's behavior and how that behavior should be managed.

b. The rules ought to be proactive rather than reactive. Those whose behavior will be governed should be informed if rules governing human behavior are to be implemented.

c. The rules should be made public. The public or institutions should be aware of the types of behavior that will be governed by legal rules; thus, supplying this information is critical to the operation of law as a system.

d. The rules must be comprehensible, which means that the implementation of the law should be understood by all parties.

e. The rules must not conflict with one another. When legal rules contradict, organizations or persons become confused about which norm should take precedence, impeding legal compliance.

f. Conformity with the regulations, that is conformity with the rules must be attainable.

g. The rules should not change regularly, that is, the regulations should not alter constantly. Legal certainty is an important component of law as a rule-making system.

h. The declaration and publication of the rules and the conduct of the individuals in charge of implementing and upholding them must coincide. The acts of the authorities in charge of putting the rules into effect and upholding them must line up with the published and issued regulations.